742 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



Military Liaison Missions apparently faced with another "Heads they
win, tails we lose" situation. Soviets may have decided they can do
with-
out their Missions in Federal Republic, relying on military attaches. In
final analysis USAREUR must decide how essential continuation of
USMLM is to accomplishment its mission; [1-1/2 lines of source text not
declassified]. If US (and British and French) decide they can do without
these Missions and, if effort through approach to Soviets unsuccessful in
obtaining more acceptable form of pass, we prepared to see their with-
drawal and to request Soviets withdraw their Missions to Allied Head-
quarters in Federal Republic accompanied by vigorous protest at
violation Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Appropriate public statement
should probably follow such decision.
    If US, British and French Headquarters not prepared to see Mis-
sions withdrawn at once, consequences of their continuation must be
studied carefully. While we may be able to live with and teams be able to
function on basis new documentation, we must face fact that so doing
erodes our position and in long run probably merely postpones final de-
cision.2
    If USAREUR asserts USMLM essential we would favor initial tri-
partite communication to Soviets questioning change in form and word-
ing of permanent passes. If, as is likely, Soviets refuse to alter form or
wording of new passes and we have decided continuation Liaison Mis-
sions essential, we should probably send tripartite communication to
Soviets along following lines:

    "Certain changes have been made in the form and wording of the
passes issued to USMLM. My Government wishes to make clear that ac-
ceptance and use of passes in this altered form by members of its Mili-
tary Liaison Mission does not constitute any change in its position
respecting the so-called German Democratic Republic. My Govern-
ment, as before, continues to look to the USSR for fulfillment of the pro-
visions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of April 5, 1957."
                                                             Herter










    2At the tripartite meeting on February 2, both the U.S. and French representatives
stated that acceptance of the change of language in the new passes might
be interpreted as
de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic. [text not declassified]
(Telegram
1431 from Bonn, February 2; ibid., 762.0221/2-260)