Preparations for the Summit Conference 183



create a convincing if muted background to Khrushchev's consideration
of our proposal. It could be pointed out through such means that unilat-
eral Soviet action would spell the end of the current detente and might
involve such specific US countermoves as:
    (a) suspension of further high level visits by US and Soviet govern-
ment officials;
    (b) slowdown on the program for increased exchanges and cultural
contacts between the US and USSR;
    (c) backing away, for the same reason, from any significant steps
toward trade relaxation;
    (d) slowdown in disarmament negotiations, since we would not
wish to conclude major new agreements with the USSR at the very time
it was denouncing existin agreements;
    (e) a greater US arms build-up, on account of the more threatening
Soviet policy reflected in the Berlin crisis;
    (f) increased consideration of "nuclear sharing" with our allies,
similarly to heighten the free world's state of military readiness;
    (g) retaliatory moves against Soviet shipping on the high seas and
step-up in propaganda to Eastern Europe.
                        IV. [sic] Conclusion
    11. Implementation. If such a program commends itself, you may
wish to:
    (a) discuss its broad outlines with the President;
    (b) direct that this proposal (i) be included in planning for the
Adenauer and de Gaulle visits to the US, (ii) be made the subject of con-
sultation with the UK at an appropriate stage;
    (c) direct State-CIA planning of a comprehensive program for
floating a "deterrent concept", designed to deter unilateral Soviet
action
which would purport to expunge our rights in Berlin.



      [Attachment 1110

      Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
      European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter

                                     Washington, January 29, 1960.

SUBJECT
    Berlin
    I have noted and passed the attached memorandum dated January
28 on the subject of Berlin in order not to delay or impede its considera-


    10 Secret. Sent through S/S and M. The source text was initialed by Kohler
and Cal-
houn and checked by Merchant. Copies were also sent to Merchant and Smith.