Status of Berlin, May-December 1960 587



omnibus or basket item, but had not yet decided when the best time for
this would be. The Soviet Union has an item attacking the alleged ag-
gressive acts of the United States, and we have thought that they would
drag in the subject of Germany under this. We would file a counter-item
relating to the actions of the Soviets increasing tensions. This would in-
clude, inter alia, their harassment of Berlin. Under this item the West
could focus on the German Berlin problem, possibly putting forward a
resolution on the subject. This would have to be decided in the light of
developments. We already had a draft resolution, Mr. Kohler noted. As
the situation develops, we will, of course, consult fully with the Federal
Republic. Much will depend on the way and the extent to which the sub-
ject arises in the Assembly.
    Ambassador Grewe said he could understand how it might be de-
sirable at the present time to leave the main issue of Khrushchev's attack
on the UN undiluted. He wondered, however, whether it would not be
wise for the West to take the initiative on the German and Berlin prob-
lem to avoid giving an impression of timidity or bad conscience on the
subject. Mr. Kohler observed that our statements on Germany and Ber-
lin in the general debate should be firm and clear, as should also be the
actions which we take outside of the UN. He was encouraged by the
progress being made in Bonn, for example, in the study of possible
countermeasures. The degree of GDR vulnerability to these counter-
measures was apparently also somewhat greater than originally
thought. He was also encouraged, Mr. Kohler continued, by such things
as Norway's coming into NATO on the subject of East German travel
and saying it was prepared to take action agreed by the other NATO
members. He hoped the Western Powers could move quickly to evi-
dence their firmness.
    Grewe said he had been disturbed by the attitude on the part of
both the Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic, which seemed to
amount to saying what are you going to do about it. Mr. Kohler com-
mented that he would be frank in indicating that we were not satisfied
that the Federal Republic was doing all it could. Grewe observed that
any action taken must be common action if it is to be really effective. For
the Federal Republic to act alone would not suffice; its actions must be
backed up by all NATO countries. Mr. Kohler, agreed that Four Power
and NATO cooperation would be essential. The British might perhaps
stress the difficulties involved, but in the last analysis they could prob-
ably be brought around. As to neutrals like the Swedes and the Swiss,
we would try to use our influence with them in the trade field to avoid
the evasion of any countermeasures that might be invoked. But we were
prepared to go ahead with such countermeasures, even if they were
only two-thirds effective.