526 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



tactics and summit expectations between May 8-9 (when the Berlin
aide-memoire was presumably transmitted from Moscow and was de-
livered in Paris) and May 11-13.
    It is likely that the basic factors determining Khrushchev's final po-
sition at the summit were the same reasons-discussed above-moti-
vating the Soviet decision to exploit the U-2 incident in the first place.
At
the same time, it seems probable that the Department's May 9 state-
ment-the new element introduced in the picture between May 8-9 and
11-13-was an important factor in Moscow's decision to adopt its final
summit position. For one thing, the statement deprived Khrushchev of
any illusion that the President would disassociate himself from the U-2
incident. Second, the US declaration that it had regularly been conduct-
ing aerial reconnaissance since 1956, and the widely-accepted implica-
tion that the flights would continue, conveyed the distinct impression of
Soviet military vulnerability. This made it all the more important, from
Khrushchev's point of view, to press the issue of aerial reconnaissance
in order to force the US to renounce these flights and to suffer a diplo-
matic defeat. Indeed, the US statement laid Khrushchev open to domes-
tic criticism of mismanagement of the U-2 incident on the grounds that
he had publicized the flights-and Soviet vulnerability-without being
certain of being able to stop the flights by military means. Against the
background of his other troubles, Khrushchev may have estimated that
his handling of the Paris meeting could well in the final analysis prove
a
crucial test in the maintenance of his power, even though he had no or-
ganized opposition in the hierarchy at the moment. In sum, the May 9
statement probably had the effect of crystallizing the final Soviet
position and may have caused Khrushchev to up his price for a summit
conference.