Reports on the Summit Conference 521



prove US-Soviet relations and came to believe the President was amena-
ble to a new agreement on Berlin. The intimations of several influential
journalists in the US press (Walter Lippman in particular) during the
winter of 1959-60 to the effect that the US and the UK were lined up
against the Germans and the French in desiring a compromise Berlin so-
lution probably reinforced this impression.
    During late March and April, however, there were a series of devel-
opments which probably dampened somewhat Khrushchev's hopes of
obtaining an interim Berlin agreement on his terms. Khrushchev re-
ceived no encouragement in this regard during his talks with General
De Gaulle in late March and early April; Khrushchev himself publicly
assessed his trip to France as only "fairly successful." Later,
in his
speeches while touring the US and Canada April 22-29, De Gaulle took
the line that the Berlin problem was insoluble at the summit and that the
summit conference should create an atmosphere of detente to lead to a
later solution of controversial issues. Secretary Herter and Vice Presi-
dent Nixon took the same general position in their speeches on April 4
and April 23,2 respectively, maintaining that Soviet threats against
West Berlin could ruin the chances for arms control agreements and that
the summit conference should "de-fuse" the Berlin threat. This
ap-
proach was reflected in press accounts of the April 12-14 Western for-
eign ministers' conference. In another foreign policy pronouncement on
April 20, Mr. Dillon discussed summit issues in firm tones, although he
also stated that "we are willing to consider interim arrangements."
3
    The Soviet press and Khrushchev personally, in his April 25 Baku
speech,4 reacted vigorously to these developments. It is possible that
Khrushchev's real interpretation of these events was that the West was
following the same pre-summit tactics as he was; i.e., stating its maxi-
mum position on the Berlin issue in order to buttress its negotiating po-
sition at the summit. However, soundings conducted in Washington by
Ambassador Menshikov in early April and Yuri Zhukov (head of the
USSR State Committee for Foreign Relations with Foreign Countries)
during April 19-27 indicate that Khrushchev was concerned (from the
point of view of both the USSR's interests and his personal prestige) that
he might return from the summit empty-handed.





    2For text of Herter's speech, see Department of State Bulletin, April
25, 1960, pp.
635-640; for text of Nixon's speech, see The New York Times, April 24, 1960,
p. 58.
    3For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 9, 1960, pp. 723-729.
    4For extracts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960,
pp. 404-406.