THE COUNCIL OF FOUR


735


After a prolonged perusal of this document
M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not see how any change could be made
in what the Council had tried to do. There was no doubt that the
Bolshevists were now going down hill. Dr. Nansen had suggested a
humanitarian course, but Lenin was clearly trying to draw it into a
political course.
PRESIDENT WILSON said that Lenin's argument was that the price
the Allied and Associated Powers were trying to exact for food was
that their enemies should beat the Bolshevists by compelling the latter
to stop fighting. What was really intended was to stop aggressive
fighting by the Bolshevists, because this was inconsistent with food
distribution. They were perfectly correct in claiming that the Allies
were supporting Koltchak and Dennikin, and not putting pressure on
them to stop fighting. Lenin's argument was that for him to stop
fighting was to sign his death warrant.
M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Lenin was not in the hands of the
Allies.
PRESIDENT WILSON replied that if supplies were stopped, Koltchak
and Dennikin would have to stop fighting too.
M. CLEMENCEAtI said it was impossible to stop Lenin fighting, and
his word could not be trusted.
PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not feel the same chagrin that he had
formerly felt at having no policy in regard to Russia. It had been
impossible to have a policy hitherto.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there had been very little choice. There had
been a lunatic revolution which certain persons, in whom little con-
fidence was felt, were trying to squash. The only reason why the
Allies had encouraged them was to prevent Germany from getting
supplies. They were, however, now entitled to say, having supported
us so far "you cannot leave us in the lurch."
PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Americans had only gone to Siberia
to get the Czechs out, and then the Czechs had refused to go.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that his Government's object had been to
reconstitute the Eastern front. They had succeeded in doing this,
though somewhat East of the line on which they had hoped to establish
it. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the front did prevent the Ger-
mans from getting supplies, with which they might have broken the
blockade. The feeling in Great Britain was that it was impossible
now to leave these people in the lurch.
PRESIDENT WILSON said that at least pledges could be exacted for
further support.
M. CLEMENcEAU fully agreed.