THE COUNCIL OF FOUR


"IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected
along clearly recognisable lines of nationality."
This, he said, was what we had been attempting to do. If we did not
do what M. Orlando had so eloquently referred to and carry out our
principles, but were to base ourselves on the Treaty which Italy in-
voked, we should be raising antagonisms which would never be stamped
out until what we were now doing was rectified. Hence, the result of
M. Orlando's proposal, namely, that other Powers than those bound
by it should adhere to the Treaty of London, and if Italy insisted on
the carrying out of this Treaty she would stand in the way of peace.
The United States of America were not bound, and besides they re-
garded it as unsuited to the circumstances of the day. If the Austro-
Hungarian Empire had survived, his attitude would have been entirely
different. For then Italy would have been entitled to every outpost
of security. Those dangerous circumstances, however, did not now
exist, and though the signatories of the Pact of London did not con-
sider themselves relieved of their undertaking, other Powers need not
regard the Pact as binding. He asked his Italian brethren whether
they were determined to take action which would result in reducing
the chance of peace with Germany, of increasing the risk of the re-
sumption of the War, and of alienating people who had been enthu-
siastically friendly to Italy. Would they refuse to enter the new cir-
cumstances of the world because they could not renew the old circum-
stances? Without the Pact of London Italy would receive her natural
boundaries; the redemption of the Italian population; a restoration of
her old glory, and the completion of her integrity. A dream would be
realised which, at the beginning of the War, would have seemed too
good to be true. The dream had come true by the gallantry of the
Italian armies and the force of the world. It was incredible to him,
even though he had actually heard it, that Italy should take up this
attitude. It was the supreme completing tragedy of the War that
Italy should turn her back on her best friends and take up a
position of isolation. He deplored it as one whose heart was torn. But
as representative of the people of the United States of America he
could not violate the principles they had instructed him to carry out in
this settlement.
M. OmAwDo said that he ought to declare to President Wilson that
if he spoke of the Pact of London it had only been at the last moment
and in spite of himself. He had only done so in order to reply to re-
marks made by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. They had
said that he would take too great a responsibility in breaking an
Alliance towards a people who say that they are ready to honour their
signature and to fulfil their obligations. He had made all possible
efforts to demonstrate that the rights of Italy rest within the bounds


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