THE COUNCIL OF FOUR


theirs still more. The original agreement had been that the Japanese
and the United States should send roughly equivalent forces. When
the United States sent 9,000 men the Japanese sent 12,000 men. He
had not objected to this slight discrepancy, but the numbers of
Japanese had subsequently gone up to 70,000, which had afterwards
been reduced to a nominal 30,000. This, however, left a great dis-
proportion. If the United States troops continued merely to guard
the railway and to maintain, as it were, a neutral position, he was
advised that collisions were bound to occur. If United States soldiers
were attacked, it could not be expected that they would do nothing.
If they were withdrawn, the field would be left to the Japanese and
Koltchak, who was supported by the Allies.
He then read a series of telegrams from General Graves command-
ing the United States forces in Siberia, bearing out the above sum-
mary of the position, and pointing out that if the present policy were
continued, there would almost certainly be a collision between the
United States troops and Russian troops.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this strengthened his view as to the
need of arriving at a policy in regard to Russia. Koltchak was
advancing Eastward [westward?] at a very remarkable rate. He
was in a position either to move Northwards and join hands with the
forces based on Archangel, or to march on Moscow.
PRESIDENT WILSON said he had always been of opinion that the
proper policy of the Allied and Associated Powers was to clear
out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among
themselves.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that before a decision should be taken,
the Council should hear M. Tchaikowsky.
PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that President Wilson should send a
reply to General Graves asking him to take no action for the
moment, as the whole problem was being considered by the Allied
and Associated Powers.
PRESIDENT WILSON said the risk of this was that there might be a
collision between the United States and Russian troops. He sug-
gested that the Allied and Associated Powers should simultaneously
ask Koltchak what his programme was.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested he might be asked two definite
questions -
(1) Will you allow the peasants to retain the land or do you pro-
pose to restore the old seigneurial rights ?
(2) Are you prepared to revive the Constituent Assembly?
PRESIDENT WILsoN in regard to the first point, said that a few days
ago he had asked a very Russophile friend whether the peasants had


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