of Bulgarian situation to aid in formulation of British reply to
Vyshinski.
  Since seeing my British colleague this morning, I have reread my
political telegrams beginning with 759, December 1385 in which I
tried to portray for benefit of Mr. Byrnes in Moscow considerations of
principle involved in Bulgarian case as seen by democratic opinion
in this part of world. Fact that basic decision in US policy toward
Bulgaria is being taken in Washington today without this Mission
having received any reaction from Department to its political tele-
grams sent since December 13 and that no request for last-minute ap-
preciation of local situation has been received have led me to reexamine
my telegrams of past month and half with greatest of care to make
sure that I have not failed to point out any factors or developments
of importance to accurate appreciation of what is involved in decision
that I understand is about to be taken.
  [Here follows a brief review of political telegrams sent by Barnes
from Sofia since December 13, 1945.]
  Foregoing review leads me to conclude that I have left nothing
unsaid that is necessary to correct appreciation of situation that
actually exists in Bulgaria and on which intelligent and responsive
decision could be taken with respect to Mr. Vyshinski's contention that
US and UK should now join with Russia in browbeating Opposition
into posture of moral dishonesty and acquiescence. However, even
though it may already be too late for this telegram to have any in-
fluence on decision of policy, I should like to suggest that there is no
half measure or further compromise left for US and UK to adopt mi
Bulgarian case. Moscow accordingly went beyond half-way mark.
Any further concessions by us would in my opinion constitute com-
plete capitulation. Either we stand firm now and fight out issue of____
free elections for Bulgaria to bitter end with Russia or we assent to"
consolidation of Communist power here that will assure Russia for
long time to come utilization of Bulgaria's territory for strategic pur-
poses outlined in my telegram 55, January 15 and Moscow's 132 of
January 15; also that we should be mindful of over-all and ultimate
effect of Russia's tactics of persistent nibbling and now see each con-
cession as separate and isolated case of cajoling Russia into better
humor. In addition, there are the moral considerations of such docu-
ments as Atlantic Charter86 and Yalta Declaration3    that weigh
against giving in to Mr. Vyshinski this time.
   Foreign Relations, 1,945, vol. iv, p. 410.
 3 Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill,
 August 14, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.
 87 Reference is to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Part V of the Report
 of the Crimea Conference, February 4-11, 1945, by President Roosevelt, Prime
 Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, Foreign Relations, The Conferences
at
Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 971.



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