FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1946, VOLUME VI



struct opposition to join the Bulgarian Gov't." We do not regard the
decisions at Moscow as requiring us to urge the abandonment of the
opposition's principles. Consequently, believing the Brit. will feel
similarly, we are exploring the possibility of reaching agreement with
Vyshinski on alternative steps along the lines you have suggested
which might be taken to achieve some solution of the problem.
  The foregoing is for your own information only.
  We made a formal agreement at Moscow in regard to Bulgaria. In
some quarters there is now a belief that since then we have been sabo-
taging that agreement by encouraging the opposition not to enter the
-Government. It is of primary importance that we avoid any ap-
pearance of bad faith toward our allies and we must be meticulous in
all dealings with the various contending elements in Bulgaria to make
it clear that we intend to abide scrupulously by our agreement in
regard to Bulgaria and to give no grounds for the belief that we would
openly or covertly support any faction in a course inconsistent with
the letter or spirit of our commitments. I hope you will carefully
avoid any action or remarks which might give a contrary impression
of our attitude.
                                                           BYRNES

874.00/2-246: Telegram
     The Counselor of the Department of State (Cohen) to the
                        Secretary of State
SECRET                          LONDON, February 2, 1946-4 p. m.
US URGENT                                    [Received 5: 50 p. m.]
  1299. For the Secretary from Cohen. We are somewhat dubious as
to the advisability of presenting the suggestion in your 1080, January
31, 6 p. m. concerning the calling of new elections in Bulgaria to
Vyshinski for the following reasons:
   (1) Vyshinski in view of his comments to you and Mr. Bevin con-
cerning the reasons for the failure of the Soviet approach in Bulgaria,
would undoubtedly regard such a suggestion on our part as open sup-
port of the position of the Opposition and confirmation of the suspi-
cions he voiced that the U.S. secretly was encouraging the Opposition
in its attitude.
   (2) Even if we were successful in persuading the Soviet Govern-
ment to advise the Bulgarian Government to hold new elections there
is real danger that since the elections are to be held by the present
Government that despite assurances to the contrary they would be
conducted along the same lines as the previous election with somewhat
the same result. Should we make this suggestion and it be accepted
we would then be committed to recognition irrespective of the results
of the new election.



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