grazing, leave cover, control predators, or practice winter feeding for the

sake of enhancing the crop of birds. When these things are done, the need

for yearly public contributions of additional seed stock will, in favor-

able regions, automatically decrease. Any or all of these activities 
will represent investments by the farmer. When the farmerts investment 
begins to plainly exceed the public's investment, two things will happen:

(1) The yield will be increased and stahlized, and (2) Some form of 
charging for the shooting privilege will begin. 
Those who are skeptical about this line of reasoning will ask: 
Why walk into a blind alley? Why not retain free shooting by continuing 
to trade free public seed for free public shooting privileges? 
If this would work, it would be fine. It will not work out 
satisfactorily in the long run because it does not focus responsibility 
on individuals. It is a collective trade between groups. It holds out 
no incentive to the individual farmer to raise a better crop than his 
neighbor by providing a better environment and exercising restraint in 
the harvesting. 
The skeptic will counter by saying: Let the sportsmen buy 
the feed, kill the cats, and otherwise "cultivate" the game crop.
The 
answer is that these cultural measures are of such a nature that they can

be executed cheaply and effectively only by the man who owns and lives on

the land. Herein lies the gist of the whole problem. 
18. Public Shooting Grounds: Analyses of Their Feasibility 3y Species. 
While it is important to get into operation some system where- 
by the average farmer will derive a revenue from his game crop and thus 
be encouraged to enlarge it, it is also important, as a means of preserving

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