April 82) as ruthlessly as they did in past within their own borders.
Basis UN or other intervention can readily be obscured by casting their
Macedonian exertions in form of ostensibly indigenous guerrilla ac-
tions, so-called civil war or free Macedonian Republic secession right
to  which  both   Communist theory    and   Yugoslav   Constitution
acknowledge..
  It was precisely this possibility we had in mind when proposing
multilateral 1Balkan border pact (Embtel 272, March 16) though
Athens sees problem from other viewpoint (Athens 626 April 1). We
would not of course recommend renunciation Epiran claim in vague
hope of exemplary-influence. What we were concerned with was de-
velopment approach which would compel Yugoslavia, Bulgaria
and Albania to give to Greece and each other border guarantees or
make it impossible for them to0mask their territorial designs behind so-
called guerrilla movements. We hoped our project would be thought to
provide that quid pro quo which we entirely agree with Athens is owed
to Greece.
  We also thought we saw advantages in proposing that Greek Gov-
ernment should take lead as genuine conciliator in Balkans along these
fundamental lines thus correcting popular misinterpretation its stand
on Epiran territories. Value Greek claim will sooner or later have to
be assessed realistically and we wonder if Greeks can count on CFM
to put through question to Greece. Very bluntly present -utility of
claim might thus be its greatest.
  If, however, Greek Government finds itself obliged hold to Pipe-
nellis position we would suggest further study of proposal our 272
using some 0other sponsor. We think Bulgarians and Albanians will be
wholly unable offer guarantees requested without disclosure of or
serious embarrassment to Moscow's plans for Macedonia and liquida-
tion of Tito. Above all, proposal presented to UN would have-merit
focussing world attention on threat to peace inherent present Mace-
donian situation and thus might well impress Soviets with fact they
cannot carry out overtý or camouflaged aggression in Macedonia area
behind curtain their own security apparatus.and world indifference.
  Sent Department, repeated Sofia 25, Athens 25, Moscow 52.
                                                           CANNON
  2Not printed; in it Ambassador Cannon observed that the removal of Markos
Yafiades taken together with recent purges in Albania and Bulgaria could
pos-
sibly be seen as a prelude to hostilities in the .Macedonian area, but Cannon
could find no local evidence to establish the probability of early armed
action.
Among the consequences of the Balkan purges was the surrounding of Yugo-
slavia by leadership groups thoroughly subservient to the Soviet Union and
the
possible exploitation of the idea of a united Macedonia against Yugoslavia.
(860H.002/4-849)


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