KASHMIR DISPUTE 1743.

Mr. Dening remarked that it would be a pity if the Indians felt that |
we were accepting their negative response and that we did not con-
template doing anything further on this matter. He stated further
that the British have considerable doubts regarding a reference of the.
Kashmir issue to the Security Council, adding that old wounds would
probably be torn open when the discussions began in the Security
Council. | |

Mr. Dening mentioned that the recent legal opinion of the British
to the effect that the accession of Kashmir to India could be seriously
questioned in view of the Stand-Still Agreement which Kashmir had
concluded with Pakistan was a bit late and that he did not see that
the UK or anyone else at this time could effectively make use of this.

Mr. McGhee inquired as to what we should recommend that the
President say when receiving the Indian negative reply (the Indian
reply had not as yet been delivered to President ‘Truman, but was
subsequently delivered at 12:45 p. m. on September 15). Mr. Dening
indicated that he thought it would be helpful if we could express the
hope that in view of clarifications by the Commission to the GOI
that they would reconsider their negative answer to the Commission’s
arbitration proposal.* |

At this point it was mentioned that such an approach might be
more effective by the American Embassy in New Delhi where they
could talk directly with the GOI and express the same hope of India’s
reconsidering. Mr. Dening mentioned that the British contemplated
taking advantage of this opening to further point out to the Indians
the desirability of their accepting the arbitration proposal and that in
view of this and the possibility of a similar approach by the US he

believed we should await further developments in the next few days
- before deciding on any further action which might have the effect. of a
_ reference back to the Security Council. | -

Mr. McGhee asked the question, “If India turns down the Com-
mission’s arbitration proposal are we agreed on the next step ¢” Mr.
Dening replied that there appeared to be little left short of reference
to the Security Council but that the thought of reference to the Secu-
rity Council by the British Government was “horrible”. The discus-
sion then centered on what the US and UK might do in the event
the issue was referred to the Security Council. It was pointed out

- that we could recommend to the Kashmir Commission that they word

their report in such a way so as to recommend that the Security Coun-

cil, in dealing with the Kashmir issue, would confine itself to proce-
dural recommendations and avoid any substantive recommendations.

1Telegram 642 to New Delhi, September 15, recommended to the Embassy an
approach to the Government of India to request reconsideration of their position
on arbitration (501.BC Kashmir/5-—2649). |