U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS


3


into a military bastion against Soviet aggression. It is our under-
standing, that American military authorities donot consider it pos-
sible to strengthen Greece sufficiently to resist full-scale -attack, no
matter how much assistance might be provided. Consequently, direct
military aid to Greece on any substantial scale will probably be
terminated as soon as large-scale guerrilla activity is ended.
  Turkey: The British decision to end aid to Greece was accom-
panied by a decision that the British Government could extend no
assistance to Turkey. This did not have the same significance as in
the case of Greece, because there had been little British :aid extended
to Turkey since the end of the war and the British plans for future
assistance to 'Turkey were comparatively modest. The Turkish state
could have maintained itself without special foreign aid. However,
during the period preceding February, 1947 Turkey had been under
severe Russian pressure16 and its government and people were justly
afraid of becoming the object of even stronger pressures. They were
therefore maintaining a large and costly but inefficient army which
the, nation could not afford :if it were to progress economically and
socially.
   The American program of aid to Turkey was designed to fulfill
 three purposes:
   (1) To reassure the Turkish Government and people of the concrete
 determination of the United States to support Turkey against the
 Soviet Union and to prevent any feeling on the part of the Turks that
 they were being abandoned, such as: might have been produced by the
 knowledge that British aid was not to be forthcoming and that there
 would be no substitute for it from another source.
   (2) To improve the combat efficiency of the Turkish armed forces
 in order to deter the Soviet Union or its satellites from aggression
 against Turkey. At the same time, the strengthening of the Turkish
 forces was designed to increase the confidence of the Turkish people
 in their ability to defend themselves and so to increase their deter-
 mination to resist the pressures short of war being brought against
 them by the USSR and its satellites.
    (3) To release badly needed man power from the armed forces by
 increasing the mobility and fire power of those forces, thus enabling
 a smaller number of men to provide an equal or superior defense.
   The objectives indicated have been achieved to a greater or less
 degree in each case. It is improbable that large-scale military aid to
 Turkey will be continued for very much longer. However, to avoid
 losing the benefits already gained and adversely affecting the morale
 of the Turkish people, it will probably be necessary and desirable to
 continue to provide military assistance on a small scale and to continue
 the military missions in Turkey for an indefinite period.

   6For documentation on the demands of the Soviet Union for the revision
of
   the Turkish Straits regme and on other matters affecting Turkish-Soviet
re-
   lations, see Foreign Relations8, 1946, vol. wII, pp 801i f.