530


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 4 9, VOLUME. VI


technical schools as well. Visual and tangible education of Iranian
Army personnel in the United States could have great impact not
only on the Iranian Army but on Iran itself.
    (2) Whatever direct aid we do give must be something more than
 merely provocative (to the neighbor on the northern frontier); it
 must be fruitful. There are many chinks in the Iranian military
 establishment that can usefully be filled in.
    (3) In giving direct military aid to Iran, nothing should be handed
 out. Everything should be doled out and we in Tehran should control
 the eyedropper.2
   (4) We must not give the Iranian Army equipment which it cannot
 absorb.
   (5) We should not give aid that can be procured locally.
   (6) After considerable thought I have come to the conclusion that
 direct military aid to Iran should come to between $32,000,000 and
 and $38,000,000 for the first year. General Evans is presently exploring
 this field. In addition to the cost of procurement one must calculate
 something like 20 per cent or more for transportation, Certain other
 military expenses should be met by the Iranian Government out of the
 American direct aid credit in the same manner as is the case in Turkey.

   There are here two American Military Missions, advisory in char-
 acter, one to the Army and the other to the Gendarmerie. The first is
 headed by Major General Vernon Evans and the second by Colonel
 James R. Pierce. Both are outstanding officers and professionally most
 competent. As things stand today, our Military Missions are very
 seldom consulted by the Iranians in the planning stage of anything
 of real importance. On the other hand, matters of a "five and dime"
 character are frequently referred to the Missions. Past experience has
 been that when anl important decision has been reached by the Iranians
 without American advice the Americans are usually called in.to advise
 on implementation. Even this advice is often ignored unless it co-
 incides with the already established Iranian viewpoint. If there is to
 be direct military aid to Iran, these conditions must be firmly cor-
 rected. The fault lies with the Shah and with the Chief of Staff,
 General Razmara.
 It will be possible to correct this situation only if in direct military
 aid we can control everything all the time. I may add with satisfac-
 tion that the two Military Missions and the Embassy work together
 as a very close-knit team. We must be permitted, in the event of direct
 aid, to maintain at all times one foot on the throttle and the other on
 the brake.
 In our dealings with the Medes and the Persians we must always
 recall that we have to do with a people for whom the intrigues of the
day suffice. They are not without talent or ability, but they disdain
the past and ignore the future.
  Yours sincerely,                                JOHN C. WILEY
  2Margina1 notation by Mr. Jfernegan : "I agree."