FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 4 9, VOLUME, V]


selves so weakened that we would collapse without even being sub-
jected to military attack. The best way to prevent war, which was after
all our real objective, was not by military preparations but by so de-
veloping our free economic and social structures that the Russians
would be deterred from attacking. I pointed to Nationalist China as an
example of the wrong policy. At the close of World War II, I said,
Chiang Kai-shek was on top of the world; he had large and well-
equipped forces enormously superior to the military forces of the
Chinese- Communists. The President and General Marshall had
strongly advised him to -concentrate on improving the economic and
social condition of the Chinese people,, but he had'chosen to attempt
a purely military solution. The result was that the Chinese people had
lost all confidence in the Nationalist Government and even in the mili-
tary field Chiang had been defeated because his soldiers would not
fight. All the vast quantities of American military equipment poured
into China had merely gone to arm the-Chinese Communist armies as
a result of the mass surrenders of the Nationalist forces.
   Now, I said, it was Southeast Asia that faced Communist pressure.
While the countries of that area would need some military equipment,
we believed that our greatest effort there should be made in the field
of economic progress so thatthe new national governments could gain
the loyalty of their people. After all, our resources were really slight
and we had to utilize them in'the- manner that would be most effective.
  In reply to this line of argument, the Shah observed that China's
downfall was largely due to corruption and he asserted that Turkey
was putting large resources into its military program and still was
able to maintain its internal stability. Some Iranians had called him a
Communist because he wanted social reforms. l-ie was opposed to the
absentee landlord system and to the exploitation of labor, but even if
he took away all the wealth'in the hands of the landlords and factory
owners it still would not amount to very much in the light of Iran's
needs and, he implied, would not compensate for tho misfortunes that
would result from military unpreparedness. I.said that I had not
meant to suggest immediate sweeping. social reforms of the sort he
mentioned and 'I agreed with the necessity for a certain degree of mili-
tary preparedness. What I wished to emphasize was the importance of
striking a balance. -With respect to the Shah's specific request for. in-
creased military aid, I suggested that he should discuss this especially
with General Bradley when he saw him later in the afternoon. We
would see what adjustments, if any could be made. It had been
difficult to get the lMilitary Aid Bill approved by 'Congress and the
amount had been reduced twice by the legislative branch. Further-
more, new responsibilities had been thrust upon us since the program
was first planned, which would make it still more difficultfor _us to


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