FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1949, VOLUME VI


  representations are insufficient to influence them, you shld, after con-
  sultation with ur Brit colleague and preferably in conjunction with
  him, immediately bring strongest pressure against Grk mil action
  until you have had opportunity consult ur Govt. If you consider it
  necessary, you may say that US wld be unable support 'Greece in any
  UN Security Council case arising out of such action, that we wld be
  forced reconsider our entire policy toward Greece and that you will
  recommend ur Govt immediate cessation mil assistance to Greece.
                                                             __WEBB
 501.BB Balkan/9-2449: Telegram
 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Cannon) to the Secretary of State

 SECRET                      BELGRADE, September 24, 1949-3 p. m.
   981. Athens 1854, September 16 just received here after servicing.
 I confess to much sympathy with Greek Government position and
 fully endorse Grady's recommendations. We are also impressed by
 Moscow's 2320, September 15 and would only observe that in support-
 ing idea of separate frontier commissions we did not and-do not
 believe they would map retreat from or even curtailment of UNSCOB.
 Moreover record will show this Embassy has been skeptical of con-
 ciliation projects and still feels we should give not one inch to projects
 which would enable Soviets to transfer to political field what they
 have failed to achieve by military intervention.
   We should not like to see any unnecessary broadening of what seems
 basic issue in Greek problem, i.e. closing of northern frontiers to guer-
 rilla incursions. Like Embassy Moscow, we would favor new attempts
 at political settlement (but of border issue only) through President
 GA and Chairman Committee 1 and it would appear (Department's
 infotel September 2, 5p. im.1) that UK favors similar procedure.
   Soviet Union acting through Albania and Bulgaria may not permit
agreement on basic issue of effective frontier conventions unless per-
mitted to participate in over-all settlement Greek case including in-
ternal issues. However we recall nothing in history of western negotia-
tions with Moscow to encourage belief that satisfactory solution of
Greece's internal problems may thus be achieved and in any event we
wonder whether Moscow may not now be sufficiently worried over
Albania's shaky isolation to permit conclusion this key frontier agree-
ment. Exclusion of Moscow at this stage seems to us well worth trying.
  We believe Yugoslavia would be more disposed to cooperate with
UN President and Chairman Committee 1 than with any group Soviet
Union can use as propaganda sounding board although present Yug0-

  Not printed.


426