SAUDI ARABIA                      59


8Q90F.00/5-1049o: Telegram.
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia'(Childs) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET,                      DHAHRAN, May 10, 1949-3 p. m.
  159. At principa audience King today at whichI received alone
and interpreter dismissed, Fuad serving as such who .said: General
international situation and that in which SaUdi Arabia involved
serious both of which causing him'serious concern. Because hedid not
wish his concern become known he had restricted audience.
   There was first Of all Communism. He had nothing to fear from his
own people. They respected him as father and he treatedthem as
such. Communists had' been successful in gaining foothold other
neighboring countries. He cites Egypt where although Moslem
brotherhood banned.Communists members still alive.
   There wassecondly innate Shereefian hostility. Yemen flirting with
 Transjordan and Iraq and SA might be encircled. From letter read
 to me previous evening by Fuad (Dhahran telegram 1541) Abdullah
 would never give up idea greater Syria. His Majesty said he had reli-
 able information Abdullah had stated to Jews he would make con-
 cessions to them in Palestine if they would support him to regain
 Hejaz.
   Thirdly, there had been cooling off in British attitude towards him.
 As US interests had increased in SA interest of UK had been deflected
 to Iraq and Transjordan. He had not heard so from high responsible
 UK officials but SA Ambassador in London had gained impression
 UK did not favor tripartite arrangements between UK, US and Arab
 States but wished bilateral pacts and US excluded.
   There was time when SA could rely on splendid fighting qualities
 Saudi soldiers to defend itself. New modern weapons now meant SA
 defenseless against tanks and military aircraft. These in possession
 of/or available to his enemies while he possessed none.
   He had in past approached US Government repeatedly for as-
 sistance but he had obtained no.satisfaction. i-e was now coming to US
 for the last time to ask our help, adequate armaments and our advice.
 He did not wish US to treat this present approach casually but to
 give it the great importance he attached to it. He was very seriously
 concerned. He could send 'Crown Prince Saud or Prince Feisal to US
 to make-known his views but their visit would advertise unduly'his
 concern and he wished to avoid the disastrous consequences of failure
 of their mission.


1 Not printed.


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