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assertion of a right by the USSR to arbitrarily send troops into
northern Iran without having it established by proper methods that
conditions existed justifying such action. He also observed we did not
feel that the Soviet-Iranian treaty could be considered as a "regional
arrangement" in terms of the Charter with the possibility that the
USSR could claim that steps, such as the sending of troops, were
justified in order to preserve the security of the whole area.
Mr. Meeker and Mr. Mangano pointed out that it would be para-
doxical, to say the least, to think of Iran as a party to the treaty of
1921, agreeing to steps against itself under guise of fulfilling obliga-
tions of a regional arrangement. It was further maintained that, where
regional arrangements might conceivably be used for "enforcement
measures" in terms of the Charter, they would usually be of a multi-
lateral rather than a bilateral character.
  Mr. Dunn queried the British representatives as to whether the
above discussion had eased their uncertainties as to the inter-relation-
ship of the Charter with possible application of Article VI of the
1921 treaty. He said we felt that the British need not consider their
treaty positions in Egypt and Trans-Jordan as paralleling a Soviet
attempt to put troops into Iran. In the former case (as demonstrated
by the Egyptian case in the Security Council) there was a matter of
maintaining troops already in a country by treaty right; in the latter
case, the matter would be one of forcibly attempting to introduce
troops, without the free consent of the Iranian Government, thereby
endangering international peace. Mr. Mangano attempted to sum-
marize the position in the following terms:
   There was no question about the validity of the treaty of 1921, and
particularly, of Article VI. Indeed, there should be no question about
the validity of any continuing treaties antedating the Charter. How-
ever, the advent of the Charter meant that member states, in seeking
to apply particular treaty rights, must do so in a manner consistent
with the Charter and with their obligations as members. Mr. Meeker
emphasized that the essential point, in resolving the Soviet-Iranian
dispute, was that force should not be used.
   It appeared that the British officials were able to agree with such
 a general formulation. They also concurred generally with Mr. Dunn's
 suggestion that the proposed Iranian communication to the Security
 Council be couched in bland and not overly-legalistic terms, avoiding
 a provocative tone, and strengthening thereby their position before the
 Security Council. It was hoped that such a course of action would
 help restrain the USSR from proceeding to any drastic action which
 might require Security Council consideration under Chapter VI.


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