WASIIMR -DISPUTE                    -1763

      7. Such a representative of the UN, assuming that an agreement
    in principle may be reached on the basis of demilitarization, etc.,
    should be given broad powers of mediation to enable the two par-
    ties to resolve any differences which might arise between them.
  Such a UN representative should not have authority to arbitrate
matters of military security."
                                                           AusTIN

501.BC Kashmir/12-2049: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
                       the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET              NEW YOR K, December 20, 1949-12: 52 p. m.
   1454. Following is text of Pakistan position as revised after
 McNaughton's conversation with Zafrullah yesterday afternoon refer-
 ence mytel1452 of December 19:
   "1. It is important to preserve the measure of agreement already
 reached between the two governments as represented by the two reso-
 lutions of the commission dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949,
 which have been -accepted by the two governments and which taken
 together cover all the stages from cease fire to the holding of the
 plebiscite.
   2. The differences between the two governments relate to matters of
 detail.regarding the implementation of Part II of the commission's
 resolution of 13 August 1948. Since these differences could not be re-
 solved by mediation, the best and most expeditious manner of dealing
 with them is to submit them to arbitration.
   3. These differences relate to:
       (a). Withdrawal of the armed forces of India and Pakistan;
       (b). Azad forces; and
       (c). Northern areas.
   The programme of demilitarization envisaged in the commission's
 resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 consisted of the
 truce stage in which Pakistan forces and the bulk of the Indian forces
 were to withdraw and the plebiscite stage in which the plebiscite
 administrator was to determine the final disposal of the remaining
 Indian and State forces on the one hand and the Azad Kashmir forces
 on the other.
   The programme of demilitarization, whether taken in two distinct
 stages or combined into one stage covering the final disposal of all
 armed forces in the State, should proceed in such manner that the
 balance of security as between the areas on either side of the cease-fire
 line remains undisturbed and should lead to the establishment of con-
 ditions in which a free and impartial plebiscite can be held.
   4. If India is not agreeable to arbitration of the points of difference
 enumerated above, an effort should be ma~de to reach an agreement