674            FOREIGN   RELATIONS, 1949, VOLUME VI

on a peg like the announcement of the British decision to release the
Jews on Cyprus.
  Another possibility, which I advanced merely as an off-the-cuff
suggestion, was that perhaps the two Governments could extend recog-
nition to Israel almost simultaneously. This would be convincing
evidence of a concerted policy between Washington and London.
   It was agreed that Mr. McClintock, in consultation with Mr. Hare
and Mr. Rusk, would prepare a tentative draft of a possible statement
and discuss it later today with Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy.
If some draft could be developed on the working level, Sir Oliver
might then send it to his Government with the caution that this was
a purely tentative draft and without top level clearance. At the same
time Sir Oliver would point out the difficulty which this Government
would face in making a statement prior to the debate in Parliament
unless it was assured that Mr. Bevin would not rake up old embers.5
  I told the British Ambassador that Mr. Bevin seemed to have come
an encouraging distance from his last position and that the decision
to return the Jews from Cyprus and the intent of the British Govern-
lnent to extend de facto recognition to Israel would have an immense
and beneficial effect on the Israeli elections, particularly if recognition
should be given immediately before the elections.

  The Department informed London on January 19 that "Such statement
was
worked out yesterday and telegraphed by Brit. Emb to FonOff. It has not been
cleared at White House." (telegram 219, 501.BB Palestine/I-1949) The
editors
are unable to identify in the Department of State files the proposed statement
passed to the British Embassy. London, on January 21, reported information
from Mr. Burrows that the Foreign Office had accepted the draft statement,
sug-
gesting solely some rewording of paragraph 2 "designed to lay more emphasis
on
Middle Eastern aspects [of] Palestine [problem]." (telegram 247,: 50l.BB
Palestine/1-2149)
  There is in the files of the Department of State a draft statement dated
Janu-
ary 21 (867N.01/1-2149). The wording of the latter portion of its second
para-
graph suggests to the editors, in the absence of the original draft, that
the
Department of State accepted the suggestion of the British Foreign Office.
The
draft of January 24, approved by President Truman, is printed on p. 691.
  In telegram 247 (see first paragraph of this footnote), Mr. Burrows was
said
to have expressed Mr. Bevin's hope that the statement would be made before
the meeting of the British Cabinet scheduled for the morning of January 24.
In its next numbered telegram, of the same date, London observed that "Foreign
Office desire for some statement re US-UK agreement on long-term objectives
in Middle East springs in part from internal political exigencies since one
phase of most attacks on Bevin's Palestine policy is that by his blundering
he
has managed to do harm to US-UK relations. There is belief here that such
US statement in some form would go far to lessen difficulties British Govern-
ment."1 (867N.01/1-2149)