ISRAEL                           1141t

impelled to make the above suggestions in the conviction that such
reo-nsideration is essential..3
  Cordially yours,                             J.is ý,G. McDoNAmD

  Mr. McGhee, in reply on July 1, advised Ambassador McDonald, in part, as-
follows:
  "Let me hasten to assure you that we have never contemplated utilizing
the
PCC as an operating agency. We have viewed-the PCC as a body Which eould
initiate studies and pave the way for the development of a resettlement program
rather than one which would implement. such a program with any funds which
might be made available for that purpose. We have had in mind for some time
the establishment by the PCC of an Economic Survey Group to be composed of
outstanding individuals whose personal authority would carry gTeat weight.
It has not -yet been possible to activate this Group, the principal reason
being
that we have not been able to get a specific commitment from the Israeli
or Arab
Governments with regard to the number of refugees which they would under-
take to repatriate 'or resettle. Under these circumstances it may be necessary
to approach the problem in a somewhat different manner, but we are convinced
that the PCC should have a -carefully formulated program as a basis for its
recommendations to the-General Assembly which will need to take the necessary.,
action to initiate the future program. . . . We fully agree with you that,
what-
ever the form of the, organization, its success will in large part 'depend
upon
the selection of a director who can- give strong leadership to the prQgram."
(867N.48/6-1549)

867N.01/6-1549: Telegram
      The Charge in Jordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

SECRET                                AMMAN, June 15, 1949--8 a. m.
  247.: Duringtalk with Prime Minister June 11, following discussed:
  1. Referring to present situation in Jerusalem, Prime Minister said
TranSjordan Government determined not to make further concessions
to Israelis and would not recede .fromits position by Israeli threat or
use of force. It would be preferable ofr Israel, which appears to have
no end to its expansionist ambitions, to make goodd it s ýdemandS
by
force and conquest than for Transjordan to make any further conces.-
sions in hope of settling problem on reasonable basis. Every effort by
Transjordan to meet with Israelis in spirit of reason and compromise
had ended in failure. (In earlier talks same day King made similar
comments stating that although he had endeavored to be reasonable,
Israel - always trying to get "stranglehold" on him). Prime Minister
emphasized that his remarks did not mean that Transjordan had
changed- its attitude re6 desire settle Palestine problem   and that
Transjordan had no, thought resuming hostilities, leonly wished to
make clear that Transjordan - had gone about as far as it could in
acceding to Israeli demands.,--
  [ Here follow paragraphs numbered 2 to 5, giving the Prime Minis-
ter's views on the desire of Transjordan to establish good relations
with Syria; the determination of Transjordan not to enter into sepa-
rate negotiations with Israel; the need o~f, Tansjordan, Egy pt, and
Iraq for internal security arms "as every bit of strength gained by