ISTANBUL CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 26-29, 1949


negotiations should succeed, the U.S. should take no direct part in
the discussions.
   Noting that it has been the Department's policy that Arab Palestine
 should eventually be incorporated into the Jordan Kingdom, it is felt
 that the time has come for the U.S. to indicate to the British that
 no objection is perceived to the early incorporation of Arab Palestine
 into Jordan, subject to the condition that annexation should be ac-
 companied by appropriate steps which would ensure fair representa-
 tion of Palestinians in the Jordan legislature. We should also indicate
 our willingness to convey this information to King Abdullah, jointly
 with the British and at a time mutually agreed. The automatic exten-
 sion of British treaty provisions following union of the two territories
 would contribute to the stability of the area.5
 10) Cyprus
   In view of the strategic position of Cyprus, it is in the interest both
of the United States and Great Britain to do everything possible to
promote stability in the Island.
  There was a general awareness that Cyprus is complementary to
Turkey in a military sense and that its security is extremely important
in case of aggression against Turkey.
  In connection with the existence of a strong Communist group in
Cyprus, it is felt advisable to indicate to the British, at an appro-
priate time, our concern about the situation and our hope that they
will increase their efforts to promote security there; the Conference
also believed that our policy of discouraging Greek desire to acquire
the Island for nationalistic reasons was the correct one to follow. At
the same time it was felt that we should make clear to the Turks
that we had no intention of supporting any Turkish claim to the
Island and our belief that irresponsible and inflammatory statements
by t%e Turkish press and certain Turkish organizations serve only
to keep the.pot boiling.
11) Foreign service morale in the Near East
  'The efficient operation of the U.S. Foreign Service in the area is
of primary importance to the pursuance of our foreign policy objec-
tives. 'It was the opinion of the conferees that a factor adversely affect-

  5Marginal notation by Secretary Acheson: "Is this correct so far as
Israeli
reaction is concerned ?" Mir. McGhee, in a memorandum of December 28,
replied:
"It was the feeling of the Conference that the automatic extension of
British
treaty provisions following the union of Arab Palestine with Jordan would
con-
tribute to the stability of the area in that it would help to remove the
Arabs'
fear of Israeli expansilon to the east. It is probable thhat Israel would
not like
the automatic extension of the British treaty provisions, but would accept
it in
the interest of obtaining a final settlement of loutstanding questions between
Israel and Jordan." (867N.01/12-2849)


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