ISRAEL © 601:

refusal to follow British calculations and ill-advised policies. But IT
am unable to square the United States’ warning that they would
review their support of Israel’s application for membership to the |
United Nations if our forces remained on Egyptian territory, with
United States’ sponsorship of Egyptian election to the Security Coun-
cil while Egyptian forces were actually invading and attacking Israel.
As a result of such sponsorship, Egypt, which defied the authority of
the United Nations and broke the peace in the Middle East, is now a
member of the very Council whose function it is to suppress aggression
and maintain international peace. © | re
Finally, I should point out that Egypt, in addition to defying the
- yesolution. of November, 1947, also failed to comply with the Security
Council’s resolution of November 16 * and the Assembly’s resolution of
December 11, 1948,‘ which ordered both parties to enter into negotia-
tions for armistice and peaceful settlement. T trust that the above sub-
missions may assist’ you in determining where the initiative,
responsibilty, and guilt for the present unhappy situation properly lie.
- I should reiterate that the Provisional Government of Israel is ready
at any time to enter into negotiations toward the speediest: possible
attainment of peace. oo | BO
oe “ _ Camm WrIzMANN
.* See telegram Delga 746, November 14, 1948, from Paris; footnote 2 to Delga
746; and editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. Vv, Part 2, pp. 1582, 1583,

and 1597. |
_* See editorial note, ibid., p. 1661.

 

501.BB Palestine/1-149 : Telegram |

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representat ive in Israel
(McDonald), at Tel Aviv ee Es

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.
3. Re ur 1 Jan 1 and unnumbered Jan 1, 11 a. m7 Dept surprised
at comments made by Ben Gurion, Weizmann and others on your
representations based on Deptel 281 Dec 30.? Plse make it clear to
them and others directly concerned that there should be no miscon-.
ception in minds of Israelis as to purpose these representations. It
was as indicated Deptel 281 to stop a move with most serious impli-
cations which Brit were contemplating. Another purpose was to avoid
if possible Brit rearming of Arabs which Brit apparently determined
carry out if all Israeli forces not promptly withdrawn from Egypt.

1 Regarding the latter, see telegram 2 and footnote 1, p. 595.
2 Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704. .