284 MINERALS YEARBOOK

per ton and released in small monthly installments. All the pooi's holdings
are said to appear in current statistics as "visible" stocks. Another pooi
was formed during 1932, but its holdings have been relatively small and its
methods apparently speculative.
 The members of the production-control group planned to foster better tin
statistics and more research to stimulate consumption of tin. Although these
activities have not been carried on very long some valuable research results
have been announced.
 In spite of the fact that the tin consumers of the United States form one
of the most important factors in the world tin industry, no representation
has been given them on the International Tin Committee. During 1932 these
consumers had little to complain of with respect to supplies and prices,
but the rapidly rising prices of the early months of 1933 lessened confidence
in the prediction made by proponents of tin-mining rationalization that controlled
production would stabilize the tin market. An article by James 1 from which
the following is quoted discusses international control of tin production.
 What are the future prospects for tin restriction from the standpoint of
the producers? They intend to retain the plan for several years and possibly
to renew it. It may, therefore, be examined as a permanent device for the
organization of an international industry. When scrutinized on this basis,
several favorable factors emerge.
 First of all, the tin-restriction plan is likely to remain in operation
for the stipulated period and even longer. It was preceded and accompanied
by a widespread financial integration of the tin industry which insures effective
cooperation among the participating international groups. * * *
 In the second place, tin restriction as a permanent plan for the industry
offers the producers an opportunity to rationalize their production. The
provision for the collection of adequate statistics and research as to the
uses of tin is an excellent initial step. * * *
 Consumers of tin should not be neglected in a discussion of restriction
plans. A world tin monopoly might benefit producers to the detriment of consumers.
At present consumers have no cause for complaint, since tin restriction,
as stated above, had little effect on price. * * *
 The future interests of consumers under a permanent tin-control plan present
a different problem. On a rising price level a control plan might be used
to extort monopoly prices from consumers. But is serious extortion likely?
No. Industrial users, as well as ultimate consumers, could shift their demand
to substitute products and could utilize more tin scrap. But equally important
as a protection against price extortion is the fact that producers themselves
would find excessive prices ruinous to their control plan. Such prices would
not only stimulate the few outside producers to expand their output, but
also they would probably cause low-cost participating producers to withdraw
from the plan. A price policy, therefore, which proved permanently successful
for a world tin monopoly, would not unduly burden the consumers * * *
 The interests of consumers in tin restriction do not end with the statement
that price extortion is unlikely. A permanent control plan offers the possibility
of positive gains to consumers through a more moderate exploitation of tin
resources. Although authorities disagree as to the total accessible tin deposits,
many believe that two or three decades of utilization at the present rate
wifi leave them nearly depleted. * * *
 Another possible gain for consumers from controlled tin production appears
in the prospects for greater efficiency through more rational contraction
and expansion of production. Unrestricted competition is assumed to promote
the highest efficiency, since only the fittest enterprises are thought to
be able to survive. But business survival may result from technical superiority
of production, more effective selling methods, or merely influential financial
connections. * * * Additional capacity saved by restriction during a depression
will mifitate against excessive prices later and thus subdue the stimulus
to recurring overexpansion.
"ames, Clifford L., International Control of Tin Ore: Harvard Business Rev.,
vol. 11, no. 1, Oct. 1932,
pp. 67—75.