Fiscal year' 
 
 
 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Number of transits: 
11,515 
1,251 
12,766 
74,128 
66,740 
140,868 
265 
141,133 
11,925 
1,353 
13,278 
74,139 
68,052 
142,191 
184 
142,375 
12,230 
1,214 
13,444 
 
 
 
~ 
 
p82,187 
151,077 
212 
151,289 
12,234 
1,207 
13,441 
 
 
 
~ 
89,408 
158,994 
303 
159,297 
11,989 
1,400 
13,389 
69,461 
84,609 
154,070 
236 
154,306 
Commercialoceantraffic 
 
 
 
 
 
Other traffic 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
 
 
 
 
Cargo moved (thousand metric tons): 
 
 
 
 
 
Commercial ocean traffic: 
 
 
 
 
 
Mineral commodities '  
 
 
 
 
 
Other commodities 
 
 
 
 
 
Subtotal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
 
 
 
 
1Yearcnding Sept. 30 ofthat stated. 
14  MiNERALS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY—1989averaged about $5,000 per
day
but by late 1988 the rates had reached an average of 
$16,000 per day and, in 1989, surpassed the $20,000 per day mark. Freight
rates for crude petroleum rose in 1989 an average of about 5% over comparable
rates for 1988 and continued the trend of the past several years despite
the end to the "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf in 1988 and the
subsequent
oversupply of crude petroleum on the world market. 
 
Panama and Suez Canals 
 
 Revised data on fiscal year 1988 shipments through the Panama Canal showed
an increase of 1.0% in mineral commodity movements rather than the decline
as previously reported, but a slight decline of 0.3% was reported for fiscal
year 1989. 
 
 In fiscal year 1989, mineral commodities accounted for45.1% ofall commercial
ocean traffic through the Panama Canal, alargerpercentage than the 43.8%
in 1988 and a result in the drop of movements of nonmineral commodities through
the canal in 1989. Table 10 shows mineral commoditymovements throughthis
canal during 1987-89 by major mineral groups. 
 In terms of major mineral commodity groups, fuels remained dominant in 1989
but dropped again both in terms of quantity and share, registering a 6.0%
decline on a tonnage basis to account for only 45.8% of the total mineral
commodities transiting the canal compared with 48.6% in 1988 and 49.4% in
1987. Industrial minerals remained in second place in 1989, with a 3.9% increase
in tonnage, to ac 
countfor27.4% of total mineral commodities compared with 26.3% and 26.4%(re-

vised)in 1988 and 1987, respectively. Total metals remained in third place
in 1989 with a 6.9% increase in tonnage, to accountfor26.9% of total mineral
commodities, up from 25.1% in 1988 and 23.5% (revised) in 1987. 
 Iron and steelingots and semimanufactures remained the dominant single metals
class, and fertilizer materials were again 
the overwhelmingly dominant industrial minerals class. Refmed petroleum products
were for the sixth consecutive year the dominant fuel commodity although
they dropped by 9.4% and remained less than one-half of the mineral fuels
moved through the canal during 1989. The amount of mineral commodities moved
through the Panama Canal continued to 
decrease despite increases in various materials over the years, such as movements
of bauxite and alumina (which increased by 62.8% in 1989)and unspecified
ores and concentrates(which increased by 13.6% in 1989) from the Pacific
to the Atlantic. The economic sanctions by the United States against Panama
and the subsequent military intervention in Panamaby U.S. forces nearyearend
1989 had little-to-no direct effect on the functioning ofthe waterway. Actions
and harassment against many of the 7,600 employees of the Canal Commission
by the Panamanian Government during the year caused severe morale problems
but did not disrupt the working of the canal since the Noreiga Panamanian
Government was adamant about avoiding any action 
that could be interpreted as athreat to the canal. The drop of$10 million
in revenue for the canal during 1989 was attributed to plummeting grain sales,
a slump in imports of Japanese cars by the United States, and generally slow
economic conditions in Japan and the United States. 
 The civilian Government installed after the invasion by the United States
has to makelong-term decisions about the operation ofthe canal because they
are to take over completely in 1999. One ofthe decisions that has to be made
is if the Panamanians want to try to operate the canal at aprofit. As mandated
bythe U.S. Congress, the Panama Canal Commission has operated the canal on
a break-even basis, and, since 1979, has taken in $4 billion and spent $4
billion. In the short term, the Panamanian Government has to decide how to
show shippers that they intend to run the canal in a businesslike manner.
Some analysts have suggested thatthe best way to do this is to rehabilitate
the canal's two ports, Balboa on the Gulf of Panama and Christobal on the
Caribbean, both of which are runbythe Panamanian Government. Balboa, where
ships enter from the Pacific Ocean, is mainly a refueling and servicing depot
for ships using the canal; Christobal, onthe Atlantic side, handles a huge
volume of goods going through the Colon Free Zone, the world's largest duty-free
port after Hong Kong. During the 1980's, however, maintenance and security
fell off at these and the country's other ports, resulting in rotting docks
and rusting and broken equipment. It will be essential for the new Government
to demonstrate that this condition can be reversed and that the canal can
operate smoothly and efficiently as a sound business venture. 
 Information on mineral commodity shipments through the Suez Canal during
1988 and 1989 was not available to the Bureau of Mines in time to be included
in this edition of this chapter. 
 
Overland Transport 
 
 The paucity of detailed information available has prevented a comprehensive
study ofthe overland international transport of mineral commodities. Large-scale
international rail shipments of mineral commodities were confmed chiefly
to movements betweenthe United States and Canada and Mexico and to transfers
within Europe south of the Baltic Sea. Notable exceptions continued to be
the