UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION 301

It can be argued that much of the current criticisms of the veto stem
not so much from the legitimate use of the privilege but primarily
from its abuse. This abuse has fostered confusion about the primary
interests involved.

2. The unanimity rule was meant to be confined in the United
Nations to the most vital decisions affecting war and peace. It is im-
portant to keep in correct perspective the significance and influence of
the requirement of unanimity among the great powers. It does not
apply to voting in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social
Council or the Trusteeship Council. It has not been incorporated into
the rules or practices of the several Commissions which have been
established, including the Atomic Energy Commission, nor into the
constitution of any of the specialized agencies.

The approach, therefore, towards a solution of the problem raised
by the requirement of unanimity is a gradual extension of the areas
wherein the probability of obtaining unanimity, or effective action
without it, is high enough to eliminate or diminish substantially the
need for a unanimity rule. This extension will be based largely upon
experience gained through the operations of the United Nations in
fields where unanimity is required.

Article 27 of the Charter which establishes the voting procedure in
the Security Council was the result of thorough and carefully planned
study in the United States and of extended and difficult negotiation.
This has also been the case only to a slightly lesser degree with regard
to other Articles incorporating the unanimity rule, such as those re-
lating to amendments, (Articles 108, 109 (2)).7? It would appear to
be undesirable to alter the Charter in this respect before the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the present provisions had been tested both
from the point of view of the interest of the United States and from
that of the effectiveness of the United Nations.

3. In accomplishing its objectives, the United States must constantly
bear in mind the viewpoint of other nations and particularly of the
Soviet Union towards the unanimity principle and avoid action which
tends to drive them into grudging, half-hearted partnership or even
out of the Organization. All the evidence at hand indicates that the
Soviet Union is, if anything, even more devoted to the principle
of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council than
it was when the Charter was signed. It is clear that the Soviet Union
feels that it cannot be assured that the fundamental principle of
unanimity will be observed and that it will not be subject to the direc-
tion of an opposing majority, in the absence of a voting formula per-
mitting a veto by a permanent member. This being so, the Soviet
Government can be expected to resist to the utmost any proposal for
even partial elimination of the veto from the United Nations Charter,
at least at the present time. The United States position, therefore,
should be along lines which will insure the maximum accomplishment
with the greatest cooperation from the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.

@ Article 108 deals with the amendatory process when the amendment is
effected by the General Assembly; Article 109(2) when the alteration is made
by a “General Conference” for which provision is made in the first section of

the article; both procedures required the assent of all the permanent members
of the Security Council.