FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL POLICY



points at the initial meeting of the preparatory committee we would
make the point that on preparing schedules for the nuclear negotiating
meeting, tariff rates only should be considered; that non-tariff trade
controls should be dealt with in the general provisions to be embodied
in the convention;
  (b) At or near the end of the preparatory committee meeting the
US would distribute its draft convention or "charter" for considera-
tion first at the nuclear meeting and later by the preparatory com-
mittee. The draft convention would, of course, deal with any un-
resolved points in accordance with our own views.
  (c) Nuclear meeting to negotiate tariff schedules and convention
would meet after sufficient lapse of time to permit adequate prepara-
tory work. Non-nuclear members of the preparatory committee could
attend nuclear meeting and participate in consideration of the con-
vention, but since the nuclear meeting may last for 3 or 4 months, these
members might prefer to await the outcome of the nuclear negotiations
before attending another meeting of the preparatory committee at
which the text of the convention worked out by the nuclear group
would be gone over by the full committee.
  4. If the Dept should view favorably program along the above lines
our first task would be to try to convince Brit of desirability of sepa-
rating negotiations on schedules from those on the principles to the
extent above suggested. This might be possible since we feel a very
strong case can be made for it. Even if Board of Trade should continue
to object it seems unlikely that Brit Govt as a whole would oppose
earlier meeting of ECOSOC committee for above purpose if a con-
siderable number of the countries concerned should advocate it with or
without a lead from us.
  5. There would remain the question timing. If the nuclear meeting
is to be held in September the Brit would raise objections to prior
consideration of our "proposals" on the ground that it would take
the
time of people in many countries who are busily engaged in preparing
for the Sept negotiations. They might be persuaded to drop this objec-
tion. if we could convince them of the desirability of trying to get the
maximum possible agreement on the "proposals" prior to the nuclear
negotiations, but in that event they might take the view that interrup-
tion resulting from meeting on principles would require mnore time for
preparatory work for nuclear meeting and consequently suggest that
the Sept meeting be postponed in order to allow for this. However, this
would provide a better reason for postponement than domestic con-
siderations (our 2907, Mar 12)47 in the event the Dept should consider
a few months delay desirable on the latter grounds.
  6. The foregoing suggestions differ from your ideas for an
August 1st meeting in that we would not deliberately hold over until

47 Not printed.



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