REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS



action. The alternatives were: (1) to push ahead toward an open
break, or (2) to proceed cautiously avoiding any votes and any aggres-
sive action against the Russian intransigence.
  MR. HANcocK: While the draft memorandum to the President is an
excellent one, it should not leave the President in the dark as to the
course we would propose to take unless instructed otherwise by him.
  MR. BARUCH: We have a clear duty to report in writing to the
President the present status of the negotiations. It is obvious that the
AEC negotiations are now only a sideshow in the international pic-
ture. In fact, these negotiations seem to have become more and more a
State Department affair, rather than our affair. The sideshow must
be tied in with the main rings of the circus. It may be that our group
should become advisory to the State Department, thereby tying it in
with general diplomatic maneuvers. In any event, it is important that
we inform the President now how things stand.
  We are handicapped by the failure of the President to appoint
members of the domestic Atomic Energy Commission. Until this
Commission is appointed, the situation regarding the disclosure of
information remains very foggy.
  MR. HANCOCK: Whether the members of the domestic Atomic Energy
Commission are appointed soon or not, makes little difference to our
operations. It cannot materially influence the course of our negotia-
tions, nor can it simplify the problem of disclosure of information.
  MR. BARUCH: Two alternatives that we could consider are these: (1)
get work started in the Commission on the drafting of the treaty, or
(2) prepare an interim report from the Commission to the Security
Council. If we must adopt a temporizing procedure this might better
be carried out by the bureaucrats.
  MR. EBERSTADT: The draft statement should be amended to include
this third alternative of preparing an interim report to the Security
Council. (Mr. Eberstadt presented a draft paragraph which would
accomplish this end).
  MR. SEARLS: The statement should contain a specific recommenda-
tion from us as to the course of procedure we think should be fol-
lowed. The statement should remind the President that whatever
course of action is taken serious consideration must be given to the
military needs of the country in the event negotiations break down.
  MR. HANCOCK: In his statement of 27 August, Secretary Patterson
clearly stated that the War Department must plan its operations on
the contingency that no international agreement for the control of
atomic energy may be reached.
  MR. BARUCH: In strengthening our military potential against the
day that negotiations may break down, efforts should be redoubled
to accumulate stockpiles with raw materials and atomic bombs.



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