ATOMIC ENERGY 1239

basis. I refused completely to consider such a proposal for the following
reasons:

a. Such an allocation would require us to decrease the present scale
of the operation of our plants.

b. Such a plan completely disregards the principle of need ; it would
permit the British to build up stockpiles of material for which they
have no immediate requirement, but which would be available at some
future date to supply plants which will be built with the advantage
of all of our costly scientific and technological developments as well
as directly or indirectly with our money.

c. Such a plan neglects the fact that the contributions to the Atomic
Energy Program have not been ona 50-50 basis. The contributions of
the British have been very small indeed.

d. Since any future war would involve a United States-United
Kingdom joint military effort, we would again carry the major war
burden. We should take advantage of our present production capacity
to build up a strategic reserve of atomic weapons. _

e. The supply of material is not sufficient to justify the building of
additional plants by a nation destined to be a partner of ours in any
major military operation.

f. The real purpose, in my opinion, is to build up a stock of materials
to take advantage of potential commercial uses.

Mr. Makins then proposed a compromise plan which would permit the
British to build up stocks which they claim they would require in 1946
if they started their program, and which would permit us to operate
the Manhattan District plants approximately in accordance with our
established program, but would not permit us to lay up stock. This
plan is summarized below:

To Be Available to the United States:
All C.D.T. materials received as of 31 1134 short tons of
March 1946, by allocation of the C.P.C. contained U;QO,
eshare of estimated deliveries of C.D.T. 1350 short tons
materials from 1 April to 31 December
1946, by allocation of the C.P.C.
Materials captured in Europe by American 525 short tons
troops, which, in accordance with estab-
lished governmental policy, are already
the property of the United States
By purchase from Canada, the current pro- 30 short tons
duction rate of approximately per month
To Be Available to the United Kingdom:
¥-share of estimated deliveries of C.D.T. 1350 short tons
materials from 1 April to 31 December
1946

As a part of the plan, we would deliver to the British 50 tons of
Mallinckrodt oxide and 15 tons of uranium metal, which represents
in all approximately 100 tons of contained U;Ox3. The refining costs