FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 46, VOLUME I



how the commission arrived at its decisions. In fact it would seem
advisable to keep the manner of action as informal as possible in
order to allow wide freedom to the commission in exploring all aspects
of the problem of atomic warfare.
  The only new question that arises is concerned with the provision
for making public the reports and recommendations of the commis-
sion. Paragraph II (A) of the Resolution provides that the commission
"shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Coun-
cil, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless
the Security Council in the interests of peace and security, otherwise
directs." This is a more generous provision than it appears at first
sight since it means that the Security Council cannot prevent the
reports and recommendations of the commission from being made
public unless at least seven members including all five of the perma-
nent members concur in such action. If any one of the five permanent
members should not concur, then the Security Council cannot direct
the commission to refrain from making its reports and recommenda-
tions public. In other words, so long as any single one of the five
permanent members is willing to have the findings of the commission
made public, the others cannot prevent it.
  This is a very favorable provision from the standpoint of the work
of the commission. It makes it possible for the commission to arrive at
conclusions and make them public even though several great powers
are in opposition. It removes the possibility that consideration of any
one question can be blocked by a single great power. The Commission
would be free to explore the pros and cons of all proposals and to
make its findings public so long as it had the support of at least one
permanent member of the Council. If the U.S.S.R. is prepared to
accept this arrangement, the U.S. should also be willing to do so.
  This means, of course, that the United States must be prepared to
have the commission make public findings which are not in accord
with the position of the United States on particular questions. For
example, the commission might disagree with the position that the
United States was entitled to an especially favorable position by rea-
son of its present monopoly of the bomb. But the commission could do
no more than make its findings public and it would not be likely to do
so if the United States were antagonized thereby.
  Some question might be raised as to whether the procedure for mak-
ing public the reports and recommendations of the commission might
lead to the unwanted disclosure of secret information entrusted to the
commission. Under the arrangement suggested in Document no. 13, all
different viewpoints on each question dealt with by the commission
would be reported on, and if a single one of the five permanent mem-



'722