FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


in this field will continue regardless of United States decision, since
such research is a normal and logical atomic development.
   (13) Question: If the super bomb is developed, should its effect
be demonstrated as an example?
  Comment: No. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that any possible
moral and psychological advantages of a demonstration are out-
weighed by its many well-known military disadvantages.
   (14) Question: Would the super bomb be in a class outside that
of a "military" weapon because it would be directed at the destruction
of large cities or rendering large areas uninhabitable for long periods?
  Comment: The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe not. They are re-
sponsible for the proper and efficient use of any weapon available to
them. Further, they do not subscribe to the belief that the super bomb
can be used only as implied in the question. They do not intend to
destroy large cities per se; rather, only to attack such targets as are
necessary in war in order to impose the national objectives of the
United States upon an enemy.
c. Diplomatic Value.
  Although this is a field in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not have
primary cognizance, they believe that: the following questions have
military connotations and as such are within their purview.
   (1) Question: Would the United States national policy be
strengthened by overt or covert possession of the super bomb?
  Commnent: Since national policy is greatly dependent upon a na-
tion's military capability and since the super bomb would materially
inerease that capability, the answer to this question is definitely in the
affirmative. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the
United States would be in an intolerable position if a possible enemy
possessed the bomb and the United States did not.
   (2) Question: What effect would renunciation of the super bomb
by the United States have upon the world?
  Comment: In the present world, where peace and security rests so
completely on the military capability of the United States vis-a-vis
Communist aggression, it would be foolhardy altruism for the United
States voluntarily to weaken its capability by such a renunciation.
Public renunciation by the United States of super bomb development
might be interpreted as the first step in unilateral renunciation of the
use of all atomic weapons, a course which would inevitably be followed
by major international realignments to the disadvantage of the United
States. Thus, the peace of the world generally and, specifically, the
security of the entire Western Hemisphere would be jeopardized.
   (3) Question: Would introduction of United States renunciation
of the super bomb into armament negotiations change the course of
these discussions ?


508