336


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUMERI


    every assistance possible short of actual participation of U.S.
    armed: forces. Further, thee question o employing U.S. armed
    forces should' be reviewed in the light of the situation at the time.
  In addition to this we must recognize the possibility of developments
in Iran, short of an overt Sovi-et move., which would place that coun-
try uider 'Communist control. Such developments are not regarded
as probable in the near future, but the possibility cannot be excluded.
The most likely variants would be a seizure of power by the Tudeh
Party, or a drift of the Iranian Government toward "neutrality"
and
a pro-Soviet attitude. There would be little we could do directly about
such a development, but we would have to act urgently to bolster con-
fidence in Turkey, Iraq, and the neighboring areas.
  :c. The testing of our firmness in other areas may take every form
known to Communist ingenuity. The present denial of electric power
to western Berlin may be in part an expression of this.'Other provoca-
tions and annoyances may occur, even up to and including an attempt
to reimpose the Berlin blockade or a possible attempt to blockade
Vienna. If any weakness or hesitation is encountered on our part,
anywhere, it will be instantaneously exploited by the Communists to
undermine confidence in us in Europe and elsewhere and to promote
a turn of political sentiment against us.
  It is essential, therefore, that our representatives in Europe be
instructed to show utmostvigilance and firmness in the face of any
and all Soviet encroachments, however minute or seemingly un-
important. We, together with other NATO powers having occupa-
tion commitments, must keep up a bold front in Europe and be
prepared to make a genuine issue of any infringements of our rights
or any threats to the security of the area. This applies particularly to
Germany and Austria, But we may encounter the same sort of thing
elsewhere, in the form of attempts at intimidation of other countries
such as Iran and Turkey.
  11. In summary, therefore, in the light of our present analysis of
likely Soviet intentions, further real Communist moves in the sense
of overt international aggression by military forces, are to be expected
only on the part of the Chinese Communists, but in other areas we
must expect a variety0f Soviet efforts to frighten us and our friends,
to divert our attention, to waste our resources, and to test our firmness.
III.. Possibility that Kremlin Might Decde for War
  12. As already stated, the foregoing analysis has been predicated
on the assumption that. the Kremlin does not intend to engage in a
general war in the near future for the reasons stated in NSC 68.
That assumption may bef-wrong. It is merely the-assumption that
seems to have the greatest support on the basis of available -data.
Should it'be wrong, and should the Kremlin be desirous ofor recon-
ciled to a general war in the near, future, then the following appears
applicable

  a. The Kremlin would have little reason to wish the outbreak of a
general war to occur before weMhad reached the point of maximumn