FOREIGN LRELATIONS, "I1950 .- OLME


      (b) adequate U.N. observation over all known and declared
    raw material sources and facilities for investigation, and if neces-
    sary, observation over all alleged ones;
      (c) U.N. supervision of large reactors during deactivization
   _or dismantling stage, followed by periodic observation over sites-
   of such reactors;
       (d) complete openness of laboratories for serious scientificvisi-
    tors on an international Scale; and
       (e) 'Periodic observation of non-dangerous activities,I1 plus ad
          0  i s e c i o s i f t e r e i s t h e. . .   ..    "n
     oc inspections"ifthersthe slightest hint of a suspicion   of
     "any illegalactivities".¶

  If these consultations with the Russians indicated .that. there was
any real possibility of agreement on this basis then severalsteps would
have to follow, the exact order and timing of which cannot be deter-
mined in advance:
  (1) There would have tio be threshed out, interdepatmentally and
presumably also in consultations with Congressional leaders, a more
detailed guiding line on exactly what this Government could afford to
accept in the way of an interim agreement along the above lines;
   (2) The other permanent members of the Security Council and
Canada would have to be advised of the results of 'these soundings and
their agreement obtained to a basic position to be taken in future inter-
national negotiations. This is particularly important in the cases of
the U.K. and Canada.
   (3) One of -these other governments ought to be induced to take
the lead in coming forward with proposals along these, lines in ,the
appropriate U.N. body.
   (4) We would then have to .take Mappropriat measures, based on
what should be by then -a public realization that we cannot in any
event long adhere to the first use policy, to, prepare public opinion in
this country ifor -the serious possibility of a modification of our position
with respect to international control.-
   In addition-to these suggestions as to how we might proceed, it is
 perhaps useful to record some things which we ought 'to avoid:
   (1) We should avoid appointing any commission of outsiders 4to
restudy-the questions of international control prior to the time when
we can be sure of some probability of Russian and British acceptance
of a new approach; and even then we should not set up such a com-
mission unless the results of its deliberations are reasonably predict-
able as ones which 'we can ,acceptu and utilize..
   (2) :We:should a-void this time taking the lead publicly with the

   11 Such a system would be along the lines recommended in the report issued
 In February, 1946, by the Committee on Atomic Energy of the CarnegieEndow-
 ment for International Peace, entitled: "A Conference Report on International
 Inspection of Radioactive Mineral Production'," This report attached
importance
 to an initial "complete revelation" : on raw materials, which,
its authors felt,
 would "make the following phases more or less ne"[Footnoteintsource
 text.]
 ¶Vyshinski's speech, November 12, 1949. [Footnote in the source text.
For the
 record of this address, see GA (IV), Adt Hoc Political Committee, pp. 207-210.]


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