FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


bases with a thermonuclear weapon may be the only effective defense
against enemy atomic attack. If, on the other hand, enemy knowledge
of our possession of this weapon causes them so to conduct operations
as to avoid concentrations of troops and materiel to a materially
greater extent than is now indicated by our possession of fission
weapons, we shall have forced them to abandon the source of their
greatest strength, employment of mass. There is an additional ad-
vantage of the thermonuclear weapon. The thermonuclear weapon
promises in the high ranges of energy release to be more efficient in
the utilization of available ore and production capacity per unit of
damage area.
  c. Hypothesis: Pos,4ession by Both Countries. It is clear that under
these conditions the world would be precipitated into the atomic age
much more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. Such require-
ments as dispersal of industry, dispersal on the battlefield, avoidance
of reliance upon ports, beachheads, large airfields, etc., would become
more mandatory and on a considerably larger scale than is now indi-
cated by mutual possession of fission weapons. Under such conditions
it can be anticipated that great stress will be placed by each pro-
tagonist on the attempt to deliver as the initial act of hostilities a
paralyzing blow on the offensive atomic capabilities of the enemy,
such as air bases for the atomic carrier force. Accordingly, it appears
reasonable to forecast that great effort must be made to allow the
development of suitable techniques of operational employment under
conditions of dispersion which will achieve an adequate degree of
invulnerability of retaliatory attack force.
  d. Hypothesis: Firm Determination of Infeasibility. Because of the
above military implications which are associated with the development
of a thermonuclear weapon, it is imperative to determine conclusively
the feasibility of a thermonuclear explosion and its characteristics.
Such determination is essential for United States defense planning,
preparations for retaliation, and direction for our research and de-
velopment programs. There are undoubtedly a number of possible
social, psychological and moral objections which may be considered
to argue against research and development by the United States lead-
ing to the development and test of a thermonuclear weapon. The above
considerations outweigh such objections. In addition, it is difficult
to escape the conviction that in war it is folly to argue whether one
weapon is more immoral than another. The United States has enjoyed
and relied upon a measure of technological advantage over the USSR.
This advantage lies principally in our industrial capacity, our stock-
pile of atomic weapons, and our ability to deliver these weapons. We
no longer have a monopoly of atomic weapons, which fact lessens our
degree of technological advantage. There are indications that the
USSR also has some capabilitty of producing a thermonuclear weapon,
To stop arbitrarily our atomic research at the frontier of thermo-
nuclear reactions would guarantee the loss of our technological ad-
vantage and further would not prevent development of this weapon
by: the USSR as long as war remains a possibility. If we do not deter-
mine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon before a war, we would
be forced to make this determination on a "crash" basis upon the
,initi-
ation of hostilities. In view of the above, it is considered that the cost
involved in a determination of feasibility of a nthermonuclear explo-


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