4FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950) VOLUME I


  b. To provide a minimum mobilization base while offensive forces
are being developed.
  e. To conduct initial air and sea offensive operations to destroy
vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity and to check enemy
offensive operations until 'allied offensive strength can be developed.
  d, To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base
areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks.
  e. To provide aid to our allies to assist them in the execution of
their responsibilities.
  7. It should be realized that the forces recommended herein:
  a. Will not insure that the United States will be absolutely secure
against attack by air or unconventionial means.
  b. Will not be tadequate to defeat the probable enemy unless aug-
mented by full mobilization of the United States and her allies.
  c. Will not be ladequate to defeat aggressive Soviet or Soviet-
directed actions in Soviet-selected areas around the periphery of the
USSR, although they will 'act as a deterrent to further Soviet or
Soviet-inspired aggression.
            FOREIGN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
  8. The magnitude and phasing of the MDAP reflected in this report
are generally designed to accomplish the following: (1) to provide
nations which are participants in the North Atlantic Treaty with
those quantities and forms of military and economic aid which they
will require in order to raise, organize, train and equip by 1954 the
forces set forth as necessary for the defense of the North Atlantic
Treaty area in defense plans currently approved by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (D.C. 28, dated 28 October 1950); and (2) to
furnish military assistance which will, in varying degrees, assist cer-
tain other nations in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (Greece,
Turkey and Iran) and in the Far East and Southeast Asia (Indo-
china, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Formosa, etc.) which are
now receiving military assistance to restore or maintain internal
security and, in the case of several countries, to perform limited de-
fensive missions in the event of major external aggression. A very
substantial portion of the total aid proposed, perhaps 75% thereof,
would take the form of armaments produced in the United States,
the remainder being primarily devoted to furnishing Western Euro-
pean nations with those additional resources which they will require,
in addition to their own, in order (a) to support a complementary
European production program of the magnitude now envisaged as

  North Atlantic Defense Committee Document D.C. 28 is not printed. For
documentation on this subject, see vol .m, pp. 1 if.


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