FOREIGN.RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


even a temporary monopoly of this weapon are so great as to make
time of the essence. 'The possibility that an incorrect decision as to
stockpiling or use might at sometime in the future be made does not
appear to warrant a further delay in initiating an ,accelerated program
to test feasibility. On this subject, it is recommended that a paper
along the lines of Arneson's draft:' be submitted to the National
Security Council working group.
  Problems (b) and (c) are closely interrelated. There are important
general policy considerations in favor of a use policy based solely on
retaliation in the event of prior use by an enemy. These include the
deep abhorrence of many of the people of the United States to the
use of weapons of mass destruction, the improvement in our public
stance toward atomic energy throughout the world if we are able to
adopt such a policy, and the greater possibility of achieving our polit-
ical objectives during and at the conclusion of a war if it is possible
to avoid the use of weapons of mass destruction during such a war.
Added to these are the strategic considerations flowing from the ex-
pected growth in the U.S.S.R.'s atomic bomb capabilities. Certain of
the military experts have estimated that within five to ten years our
present net strategic advantage in atomic weapons may be neutralized.
This equation would be materially affected by the U.S.S.R. develop-
ment of a thermonuclear weapon inasmuch as we seem to be more
vulnerable to the use of such a weapon than is the Soviet Union.
  A final determination as to use policy can only be arrived at after
much fuller joint study with the Defense Establishment than has as
yet been possible. Such a study could take place under the aegis of
the National Security Council in connection with the currently
scheduled review of U.S. objectives, commitments and risks, or as the
result of a special directive to the National Security Council as sug-
gested in Arneson's draft paper on the thermonuclear program. The
political, psychological and moral imponderables bearing on this prob-
lem as they affect our strategic plans and our related objectives and
programs would seem to fall in whole or in part within the com-
petence of the State Department.
   It is recommended that the State Department representatives go
into such a study with a preliminary presumption in favor of such a
revision of our strategic plans as would permit of a use policy re-
stricted to retaliation against prior use by an enemy.
   The two most difficult points to meet will be (1) what do we sub-
stitute for the present presumed deterrent effect of our atomic bomb
  'Reference is presumably to a preliminary draft of Arneson's working paper
of January 24, 1950, concerning the development of thermonuclear weapons.
Regarding that document, see footnote 1, p. 513.


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