FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


   4. In discussing this issue, the Delegation should be careful to
avoid statements which would appear to justify the limitation of
trade liberalization measures to OEEC countries on the basis of
Article XXIV dealing with customs unions 'and free trade areas.
This article is not applicable because there is no agreement among
these countries to achieve a customs union or free trade area nor is
there agreement on any specific interim   plan to achieve these
objectives.

International Trade Files, Lot 57D284, Box III
Extract Fromr Confidential Report by Mr. Henry F. Grady, Chairman
   of the United States Delegation to the Fourth Session o/the Con-
   tracting Parties to GATT, to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL                             [WASHINGTON, April 1950.]

13. Consideration of Quantitative Restrictions on Imports and Exports
   This subject had originally been proposedby the US as two separate
items which were subsequently combined into one.
   (a) Quantitative Restrictions on Exports
   The United States delegation's position papers pointed out that
export restrictions were being widely used for protection and pro-
motional purposes under circumstances not permitted by the agree-
ment and instructed the delegation (a)-to obtain agreement among
the contracting parties that certain types of export restrictions were
in violation of the GATT, and (b) to obtain agreement among the
contracting parties that the Secretariat should collect data from the
contracting parties on existing export restrictions.
  It was evident at once, in the early plenary sessions that most of
the CP's were reluctant to include the item on the agenda. The most
vocal resistance came from the UK and NZ. Both countries based
their resistance on the contention that the GATT spoke for itself on
the question of export restrictions and that the appropriate means
for detenrmining the meaning of, and enforcing the provisions of the
Agreement was through the consultation procedures.
  The US promptly initiated informall private conversations with the
UK and NZ delegation, in the course of which they amplified their
objections to the inclusion of the item. The UK pointed out that the
GATT was a delicately balanced instrument, with many intentional
ambiguities which represented compromises in basically conflicting
viewpoints, and that the proposed exercise might have no other result


714