392


FOREIGN. RELATIONS, 1950,, VoLUME t


Policy Planning Staff Files
emorand ur by the Ambassador at Large (Jesup,) to the Director
                 of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)

 TOP SECRET                        [WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1950.
 -Subject: NSC Senior Staff Consideration of NSC 79 1
   The NSC Senior Staff considered NSC 79 this afternoon. Admiral
 Wooldridge explained what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind in
 submitting NSC 79. The Joint Chiefs appear to have had a more
 limited objective than we had arrived at in this morning's meeting in
 S/P. Admiral Wooldridge addressed his remarks principally to the
 need for instilling in our own people in this country and among the
 people of our allies, as well as the dissident elements in Russia and.
 the Satellite countries, some of the zeal and fanaticism that Nazis,
 Fascists and Communists display. He felt that a study should be under-
 taken to determine what it was that we lack and others had to make
 them fight for their objectives. He felt that we should have a program
 of concrete objectives to appeal to the man in the street at the out--
 break of war which would cause him to rally to our side whether he
 was American or French, Czech or Indochinese. President Wilson's
 Fourteen Points had such a definite appeal, he recalled. He alsoý
 pointed out that our studies should enable us to avoid ad hoe decisions
 taken on short notice like the decision for unconditional surrender.
 Admiral Wooldridge gave the impression that he was thinking prin-
 cipally in terms of a propaganda appeal based largely on studies of
 mass psychology and historical precedents to be undertaken by
 psychologists and historians rather than in terms of the"immediate
 and long-range problems with which we were concerned in our meet-
 ing this morning. Admiral Wooldridge indicated that the Joint Chiefs,
 of Staff were thinking of statements which could be used both-on
 D-Day to inculcate zeal for victory and at the present time as a. de-
 terrent to war.
 The ensuing discussion veered away from Admiral Wooldridge's
 proposal for psychological studies and came closer to the lines of
 thinking expressed in this morning's S/P meeting. It was recognized
 that we should emphasize the present need for steps to prevent the
 outbreak of war as well as the need for steps for winning the war. It
 was agreed that if war came we should be prepared in advance with
our long-range war aims. All agreed that NSC 20/4 2 represented
broad aims which were generally acceptable but which required spell-

  Supra.
  2 For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.