34FOREIGN RELATIONS) 1950, VOLUME I


decision to achieve a rapid and substantial development of the strength
of our armed forces and the armed forces of our NAT allies and by
solid evidence of the economic and industrial measures to make this
decision effective. Measures under this heading include:
  a. Federalization of the National Guard and employment of the
draft to accomplish a rapid increase in forces under arms; re-activation
of available air and naval equipment.
  b. Appropriation of funds and placement of orders to equip these
forces as rapidly as possible, including adoption of necessary
economic control measures (Such as authority to allocate scarce mate-
rials and to impose limitation 0rders) , and activation of idle capacity
and development of new capacity for production of military end-items
and related items.
  c. Acceleration of rate of MDAP deliveries to Western Europe and
appropriation of funds necessary for this and for expanding military
production in Western Europe.
  d. Initiation of an intensive program for development and perfec-
tion of new defensive weapons.
  It is of the greatest importance to make a start without awaiting the
perfection of detailed plans, if necessary by requesting round-number
appropriations for these purposes as a first step toward building the
strength which the Korean crisis has shown to be necessary.
  2. It is also important to take measures which will increase the
confidence and solidarity of the free world. It also includes increased
economic assistance to potentially threatened areas, possibly $300
million.

Acheson Papers-
     Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 2

TOP SECRET                             [WASHIINGTON, July 14, 1950.
   At the Cabinet meeting this morning the Secretary made the follow-
ing statement on the Korean crisis and related possible developments:
  The Secretary was asked what the State Department's judgment
was on the probable danger spots were with reference to possible fur-
ther communist or Soviet moves. The Secretary said that he did not
think that it was profitable for him to go over specific spots again,
since General Bradley had reviewed these military danger spots, and
the next crisis might arise at any one of a dozen places. The main point
was that the State Department and the Pentagon were agreed on the
following general podints":
  "Papers of Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, 1949-1953, at the Harry
S.
  Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
  2This document was drafted by Barbara Evans, Mr. Acheson's personal secre-
  tary, on the basis of his report of the meeting.


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