NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


   In answer to a question from General Burns as to whether
iDr. Oppenheimer believed that Communism bears within itself the
seeds of its own destruction, the reply was that probably, yes; but, of
.course, the main question was the matter of time. Dr. Oppenheimer
"said that he thought time was well worth playing for but he expressed
ýsome doubt as to whether this destruction would occur prior to a
war.
He suggested that there were millions of people in the Satellite coun-
tries who were yearning for war as the only way that they can now
;see of escaping Soviet bondage.
   With regard to the H-bomb, he thought that the preferred Russian
:means of delivery would be either through ships in our harbors or
rockets launched from submarines, and that strategic bombing with
the H-bomb would definitely have third priority although the order
amight very well be reversed for the A-bomb.


                             [Annex]
                     Outline of Draft Report

                               [WASHINGTON, February 27, 1950.]
                       TERMs OF REFERENCE
  -I. Backgrounds of the Present World Crisis.
  II. Fundamental Purpose of U.S.
  III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin.
  IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values
-Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design.
  V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities---actual and potential.
  A) Political
  B) Psychological
  C) Economic
  D) Military
  VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities-actual and potential.
  A) Political
  B) Psychological
  C) Economic
  D) Military
  VII. Present Risks.
  VIII. Possible Courses of Action.
  IX. Recommended Measures.


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