FOREIGN.. RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


United States must also be alert to the possibilities of sabotage and
subversion in this country.,
                           CONCLUSIONS
                              PART I

      Possible Further Societ Moves in the Immediate Future
Possibility of Global War
  27. Since 1945 the USSR has continued materiallyto0 increase its
capability to wage global war. Even though there is no conclusive
indication that the USSR intends to launch a global war at this time,
the danger of Soviet resort-to war, either deliberately or by miscalcu-
lation, may have been increased by the Korean war. Even an immedi-
ate solution of the Korean crisis would not obviate this danger,.
Isolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces To
     Achieve Local Objectives Nat Designed To Bring on Global War

  28. There is as yet no: conclusive evidence that the Soviet Govern-
  ment has or has not decided to commit its forces, alone or with satel-
  lite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against local -and limited
  objectives, without intending to bring on global war. However, if a
  decision should be made to use USSR forces in this manner, action
could bo taken with varying degrees of risk in any of the following
areas: Finland, Korea, the Near and Middle East, and the Balkans.
Soviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces
   29. Use of European and Asiatic satellite military forces against
 a variety of objectives is a possibility for the immediate future.
   a. An immediate possibility is the use of Chinese communist forces
 in Korea and against Formosa. The prevention of an invasion of
 Formosa is primarily the responsibility of CINCFE employing the
 United States Seventh Fleet and appropriate air -forces. The success
 of an early attack on. Formosa would be doubtful unless accompanied
 by the collapse of the Nationalist forces and regime.
   b. In addition, depending upon developments in the world situa-
tion, the: USSR might inspire aggression by satellite iforces against
Western Germany (including Berlin), Austria, Yugoslavia, Greece,
Turkey, Tibet, Burma, Indochina, Hong Kong, and Macao.
Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR
   30. We must also expect a variety of Soviet efforts to achieve vic-
tories .by subversive action and tactical maneuvers in the "peace of-
fensive" 'to keep us off balance, to di vert our attention, to waste
our
resources, to test our firmness, and to split the free world.


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