NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


forth in the enclosures to their memorandum of 1 September 1950* are,
from the military point of view, the minimum necessary to fulfill the
fundamental obligations of:
   a. Protection against disaster,
   b. Support of our foreign policy.
   2. In accomplishing the current review, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 have been mindful of their memorandum to you dated 13 November
 1950  and have given consideration to your memorandum to them
 dated 17 November 1950.4 The appendices hereto maintain the forces
 contained in the memorandum of 13 November 1950, but reflect an
 effort by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with respect to
 manpower and costs, to arrive at a reasonable compromise between
 military requirements and other considerations. Attention is invited
 to the fact that personnel and cost estimates contained herein were
 prepared in a very brief time and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
 not been able jointly to screen the manpower and materiel require-
 ments. Such an examination should be -made more thoroughly prior
 to implementation.
   3. The programs described herein impose a lowered military pos-
ture which, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, increases the
risk with respect to our ability to defeat the probable enemy in the
event of global conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would also empha-
size that whatever future annual program objectives are established
the practicability of attaining them will inevitably be influenced in
high degree by the budgetary actions taken for Fiscal Years 1951
and 1952. A solid base must be established in these two years if suc-
cessful achievement of objectives of any effective future programs is
to be realized.
  4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are mindful that any programs
adopted for long-range planning guidance must be kept under con-
tinuing review, being responsive to changes in the political-economic-
military situation and also recognizing the presently estimated need
in 1954 for the forces as submitted to you on 1 September 1950,
  5. If, after due consideration of the increased risks involved, it
is determined that there are compelling reasons for reducing pro.
gram objectives even below those submitted in our memorandum of
13 November 1950,-the revisions enclosed herewith are forwarded for
this purpose as follows:

  *See Annex No. 1 to NSC 68/1. [Handwritten footnote in. the source text.
NSO
68/1 and its annexes are not printed; for NSC 68/3 and iAt annexes, December
8,
see pp- 425'and 432, respectively.]
  'Not found in Department of State files.


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