FOREIGN ,RELATIONS, 195-0, )VOLUME I


   4. Cominforn.2 Perhaps the mostIbasic demand wich we would
 feel must be made if international confidence and trust are to be
 restored is that the Soviet effort to create disorder and revolution
 throughout the world, through the medium of centrally-directed Com-
 munist parties, be completely given up. It is difficult to see how peace
 between East and West can ever be durable as long as the East is
 perpetually engaged in vigorous efforts to overthrow the governments
 of the West. Yet the abandonment of this program would clearly be
 contrary to all the tenets of Marxist-Leninist theology and would
 certainly not be seriously contemplated by the Kremlin unless it were
 in a far weaker position than it is today.
   5. Iron Curtain. Furthermore, we would probably feel that we
 could have no security unless the people of the Soviet Union and the
 satellites were given an opportunity to learn the truth about world
 events and hence to be able to act insome degree as a check upon their
 rulers; in other words, unless the iron curtain were breached. Yet it
 seems certain that the Kremlin would consider this a dangerously
 subversive measure which would undermine their entire political posi-
 tion, and would therefore reject any important change in their present
 policy.
   6. The Satellites. A related demand on our part might be that the
 camp~aign of persecution and harassment of Western interests, na-
 tionals and ofticials in the Soviet satellites in Europe and Asia be
brought ,to an end. However, since the purpose of this campaign is to
cut off the satellite people and governments from contact with the
West and-cement Soviet control, it hardly seems reasonable to suppose
that the Soviet leaders would make more th'an minor and ineffective
concessions on this score.
   7. Peace Treaties.
       A. Germnany,. The problem of Germany was discussed thor-
     oughly at the CFM in Paris last May and June.3 The essence of
     the Soviet proposal at that time was a return to the rigid Four-
     :Power control of all Germany, -which would give them the veto
     'over our action in Western Germany. The essence of the Western
     position was adherence by the Eastern German Laender to the
     Bonn Constitution after supervised, free ,and secret elections in
     those Laender. It is possible that both parties might move some-
     ,what from these. positions, but it. seems impossible to imagine
     either that the West would consentt to a treaty or an arrangement
     which would enable the Soviets to block the democratic constitu-
     tional developments now taking place in West Germany and the
     closer 'association of West Germany with the rest of Western
     Europe, or that the Soviets would agree ,to a treaty or an arrange-
     ment which would effectively remove Eastern Germany from

  2Documen tation on the attitude and response of the United States to the
Soviet "peace offensive" and the use of international organizations
as instru-
ments of Soviet foreign policy is scheduled for publicatlion in volume iv.
  For documentation on the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers,
Paris, May 23-June 20, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. II, pp. 856
ff.


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