NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


cussions in Europe was discussed at the Rome meeting.2 It was the
feeling of the group assembled there that there would not be adverse
repercussions provided we had really'thought through what we in-
tended to do and had a feasible plan laid out. They felt, however, that
the effects would be extremely bad if we started such a campaign with-
out a clear idea of what we were goingto accomplish and how'we were
going to accomplish it. They therefore urged strongly, although this
was not'included in the report of the meeting, that a thorough study
be undertaken of both- the economic and military requirements in the
cold war before "any other action was started. This, I understand, is
in
accordance with recommendation B in the Report to the President.3,
   On page 24, the second paragraph, point 4, there is an indication
 that economic assistance programs will have to be increased somewhat.
 I would question this seriously. It seems to6me that the present size of
 the programs is wholly adequate and probably appreciably larger than
 Will be necessary f, in thew future What we need to recognize is that the
 need for economic assistance willT be a' continuing one and in substan-
 tial amounts.
 On the question of increased military expenditure, there was con
 siderable talk in Europe about what was, referred toas "a poor man's
 war". It was the general feeling that we could not meet Soviet forces
 tank for tank or necessarily match them. in other items of equipment
 without destroying the economy and consequently the civilization we
 are trying to protect. This implied the importance. of developing in-
 expensive but effective weapons which could be used effectively in
 defense. Some progress has certainly been made in this direction, but
 it may well be as General Gruenther4 said to Ted Achilles5 that
 what we need is a Manhattan project to produce an inexpensive de-
 fense. If this is correct, and it may well be, it i possible that a sub-
 stantial increase in miiHtary expenditure may not be necessary but
 rather reallocation of present available funds.
 At the bottom of page 7 and at the top of page 8 of the conclusions
 in the report to the President, here is an indication that after we ýhve
 built up strength We might successfully undertake negotiations with
 the Kremlin. I Would seriously question the possibility of this until
 such time as the Kremlin has changed its philosophy. I do not believe
 that this change will come about through outside pressure but will re-
 'For documentation on the meeting of United States Ambassadors at Rome,
 March 22-24, 1950, see vol. I, pp. 795 if.
   See NSC 68, April 14, recommendation b, p. 292.
   Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, United
States
Army.
  ' Theodore C. Achilles, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs.


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