NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY — d61

in document NSC 78, August 7, 1950 (which concluded that the chief
presumed danger of unconventional attack against the harbors,
territorial waters, and installations of the United States lay in the
uncontrolled use of American ports by Soviet and Soviet satellite ves-
sels), should be put into effect, subject to the working out of details
between the departments and agencies concerned. On October 18, 1950,
President Truman issued Executive Order 10173 (15 F.R. 7005)
which instituted a program of port security closely following the rec-
ommendations of NSC 78. The text of NSC 78 and related papers are
scheduled for publication i in volume IV. |

 

661.00/8-850 _

M emorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET — [Wasurneron,] August 8, 1950.

- I thought it might be useful if at this juncture I were to make a
round-up of Communist intentions, as far as they seem to. me dis-
cernible on evidence now available. ,

1. The Soviet Communists did not launch the Kor ean n operation asa
first step in a world war or as the first of a series of local operations
designed to drain U.S. strength in peripheral theaters.. They simply
wanted control of South Korea; saw what looked to them like a favor-
able set of circumstances in which to achieve it; feared that if they
did not achieve it now, time might run out on ‘them. ‘Lhey did not
think it likely that we would intervene militarily, and thuught that.
" we did try to intervene we would get there too late. :

2. While there is no reason, as indicated above, to believe that the
Soviet leaders desired a general military conflict at this time, that
does not exclude the possibility that they might now consider it less
likely that the early outbreak of such a conflict could be avoided. It is
entirely possible that this may be their frame of mind at the moment;
and it should be noted that in this case their behavior in the conduct
of their affairs would be in large measure the same as though they
themselves had deliberately decided to unleash a general war.. —

It may be asked, of course, how they could come to consider war
probable though not desirable, when a few simple concessions on
their part would suffice to remove the danger. The answer is that
they are conscious of weaknesses in their own position which we, for
one reason or another, ignore; and what appear to us as easy and
cheap concessions on their part look to them like initial steps in a
process which could easily lead to a crumbling of their entire struc-
ture of power.