NATIONAL .SECURITY POLICY


tive flexibility and mobility of funds which should be achieved through
legislation and appropriations covering as broad areas as possible.
   It is unlikely, however, that Congress would enact one set of pro-
visions or grant one lump sum appropriation for so broad a variety of
activities. It seezms necessary, therefore, to present the programs under
several titles (as few as possible) in the bill.
   The broad objective of strengthening the ,free world as approached
 with two related but separable types of program. Our emphasis in
 Europe land a few other countries is primarily to help build military
 strength. Our emphasis in most other areas is to help achieve eco-
 nomic progress as a basis for the maintenance of stable and 'friendly
 governments. It seems desirable, therefore, if it is feasible, to deal
 with the European problem in one title. We have been furnishing
 three kinds of assistance to these areas, (a) military end items, (b) eco-
 nomic aid in support of the military effort abroad, (c) aid to achieve
 European economic recovery. The advantages of combining all of these
types of aid in one title are as follows. (1) Congress is more likely to
be sympathetic toward a program based upon military security than
one in which part of the justification is based on continued economic
recovery. (2) The three types of assistance are in effect closely inter-
related. Maximum flexibility is needed between funds available for
procuring U.S. manufactured end-use items and for the production of
such items abroad. The distinction between ,aid in support of foreign
military effort abroad and aid for economic recovery is largely artifi-
cial. If part of the economic aid were put in a separate appropriation
under the label "recovery" and used primarily for certain countries
where the military effort was slight in relationship to the amount of
aid required those countries might feel it reflected an attitude on our
part that their military effort or strategic positions were relatively
unimportant.
   There are several reasons for requesting part of the funds needed
 under the old ERP legislation. It would be hard to justify to Con-
 gress the amount of aid needed for Austria, Germany, Greece and
 probably Italy on the basis of the military effort of those countries.
 Furthermore, the abandonment of the ERP at this stage might be
 interpreted abroad as indicating a lack of interest on our part in their
 welfare and internal stability and a resolve to sacrifice these objectives
 in order to build up a fighting force in our own defense. It might in
 fact be difficult to give sufficient weight to the purely economic objec-
 tives which we have heretofore been pursuing under legislation de-
 signed primarily to support a defense program. Probable additional
 support for the EPU and other important economic objectives might
 have to be sacrificed.


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