.NATIONAL, SECURITY POLICY223


   It i6s rue that the paper refers to our limited capacity of defens
 n the      o eta e   ntheevent     war, but I rather question that
 criterion 6as- a valid onefordetermining the Size and adequacy of our

 defense :establishment. tIf: thegeographic :.crierion alone is used, it
 would seem: toentail a- defens eStablishment beyond anything that
 is reasonable since in Order "todefendtheý areas ofthe world
not now
 under Soviet domination, and of direct interest to the United States,
 would appear to imply a defense establishment in time of peace which
 would involve almost full-time war mobilization in the United States
 antd-the Atlantic Pact countries.
   The most important statements in the paper are those which reveal
 that the gap is widening between Soviet military power in being and
 that of the United States and its.allies. It seems to me here lies the
 core of the paper, and perhaps more evidence in support of: the thesis,
 whose validity I do not in any-way qu6stion, would be very useful-in
 supporting the conclusion that we must make a greater military effort.
   Another factor which I think ,is of some importance is that there is
 not throughout the paper a clear enough distinction made between
 the military requirements for a cold war as against those required in
 the event of actual hostilities. It would seem to be valuable, therefore,
 to add a section dealing ,with the consequences, both advantageous and
 disadvantageous,, of the annowwemnent- and inauguration of a large
 scale program of rearmament in the circumstances of the cold war. I
 think we should recognize clearly that in its initial phases and:until its
 results begin to be visible such a program would-tend to hamper rather
 than help in the cold war. I am.not suggesting it should not be done,
 but it should not be presented on the basis that the mere fact of the
 inauguration of the program -would be heartening, etc., to public opin-
 ion in the free world. I can elaborate this point 'with further details
 if you so desire.
   Another point which might be made more precise would be an
analysis of exactly what, 'in the present world, constitutes a deterrent
to the launching of war by the Soviet Union. As you know, I believe
that too much emphasis has been given to the atomic bomb as a deter-
rent in the past while we held the monopoly. I think it "is difficult
to
deduce any evidence that this 'monopoly on our part influenced Soviet
policy during this period or abated its aggressiveness. Conversely
and logically, there has perhaps been too much emphasis placed upon'
the effect on Soviet policy of their possession of the atomic weapon.
I would like to make the 'following concrete suggestions for changes
in this paper:
   (1) While I believe the section on a free versus slave society to be
,excellent and well worth retaining as supplementary reading, I believe,


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