REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS


merely to emphasize that if it should really be our purpose to move as
rapidly as possible toward the removal of this weapon from national
armaments without insisting on adeep-seated change in the Soviet
system, there are a number of features of our present position which
do not seem to give maximum recognition to- such a motive. The ques-
tion of the extent to which these suggestions0 could b Utilized in inter-
national negotiation, and of the manner in which this might be done,
is a separate question, involving many important considerations of
political wisdom and tactics, and will be discussed below.
  It is also not intended to suggest that modification of our position
along the-lines indicated above would guarantee agreement with the
Russians or even with our western allies. It is true that with the
international authority and the veto out of the picture, and with firm
U.S. ,assurances that staging would not operate to Soviet disadvantage,
we would have met what appear to be the principal Soviet objectives
[objections?] to the present U.N. majority plan. However, any new
proposals along the lines suggested above would certainly raise new
questions which have not heretofore had to be faced. There is no assur-
ance that the inspection provisions we would still find it necessary
to insist upon, even under a temporary agreement of this sort, would
prove to be palatable to-the Soviet leaders, although they would cer-
tainly be less onerous than the interference in Soviet life which would
be called for by the operation in the Soviet Union of an international
authority owning and managing large installations. liii
   The most serious question is whether the Russians would agree to
 forego all development of atomic energy in large-scale reactors for
 peaceful uses. There is every evidence that the Soviet leaders not only
 attach high importance to experimentation with the peaceful, uses of
 atomic science but that they regard it as a matter of prestige that
 the "socialist" state:keep itself entirely free to proceed with
such
 development, unhampered by, any physical interference from the
 capitalist, side. They believe such interference to be implied by the
 present U.N. plan. They might well take a similar view of-the obli-
 gations inherent in the sort of arrangements suggested ,above. In this
 view, there is probably a reflection of the tendency toward techno-
 logicaliescapism  which is natural to a country where economic
 development has been extremely uneven-a country which has highly
 primitive areas in its economy and which is always searching for
 means whereby whole stages of technological development experienced
 by the older industrial nations can be skipped over entirely.

   -iI!It is interesting ýto note !that neither Squires and Daniel'nor
Newman
 considered their ideas likely of acceptance by the Russians. [Footnote in
the
 source text.]


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