FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, YVOLUME I


  In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of its own dynamism.
This dynamism can become a weakness if it is frustrated, if in its
forward thrusts it encounters a superior force -which halts the expan-
sion and exerts a superior counterpressure. Yet the Kremlin cannot
relax the condition of crisis and mobilization, for to do so would be
to lose its dynamism, whereas the seeds of decay within the Soviet
system would begin to flourish and fructify.
  The Kremlin is, of cours, aware of these weaknesses. It must know
that in the present world situation they are of secondary significance.
So long as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so long as it can keep
on the offensive unchallenged by clearly superior counter-force-
spiritual as well as material-its vulnerabilities are largely inopera-
tive and even concealed by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet been
given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot within its system.
B. Ecorbonoic
   The Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its overall
policies. Economics in the Soviet world is not an end in itself. The
Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to do with economics, is to utilize
economic processes to contribute to the overall strength, particularly
the war-making capacity of the Soviet system. The material welfare
of the totalitariat is severely subordinated to the interest of the system.
   As for capabilities, even granting optimistic Soviet reports of pro-
 duction, the total economic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares with
 that of the U.S. as roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in
 gross national product (1949: U.S.S.R. $65 billion; U.S. $250 billion),
 but in production of key commodities in 1949:
                                                         U.S.S.R. and
                                                           European
                                                             Orbit
                                       U.S.     U.S.S.R.   Combined
 Ingot Steel
   (million Met. tons)                   80.4     21.5        28. 0
 Primary aluminum
   (thousands Met. tons)                617. 6   130-135     140-145
 Electric power
   (billion kwh.)                       410       72         112
 Crude oil
   (million Met. tons)                  276. 5    33. 0       38. 9
           0
   Assuming the maintenance of present policies, while a large U.S.
 advantage is likely to remain, the Soviet Union will be steadily re-
 ducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and
 that of the U.S. by continuing to devote proportionately more to
 capital investment than the U.S.:


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